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1727 
“UNDERDOG” ARBITRATION: A PLAN FOR 
TRANSPARENCY 
Ramona L. Lampley* 
Abstract: The use of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer, 
employment, health-care, and even nursing home agreements is ever-increasing, even though 
the general public has distrust and a lack of understanding of the nature of arbitration. The 
Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, and then in American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, has signaled firmly that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration is here 
to stay. This is true even for individual low-value claims in which one party, say the 
consumer or employee, has little or no bargaining power. I call these claims “underdog 
claims.” There have been numerous proposals to amend the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to 
exclude such claims from mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements and numerous 
criticisms raised in reaction to the Court’s jurisprudence. But with the Supreme Court’s 
theoretical view that arbitrating underdog claims is fair, these criticisms have gone unheeded 
by the majority of the Court. Now the question is how should we approach this new field of 
dispute resolution in which so many claims will be resolved? This Article analyzes the 
meritorious criticisms of underdog arbitration, which include bias, the repeat-player effect, 
the removal of publicity, the lack of judicial oversight, and a general concern about the lack 
of transparency. Then I propose a three-part solution for promoting transparency to establish 
a system in which underdog arbitration can work. I propose that the FAA be amended to 
require transparency in consumer and employee claims through: (1) uniform data reporting at 
the arbitration service-provider level; (2) requiring a written statement of decision in such 
disputes; and (3) data-reporting requirements by the business entity imposing mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration on the employee/consumer stake-holder. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The consumer, employment, corporate, and health-care spheres now 
operate in a world in which binding individual arbitration is permitted 
and widely employed.
1
 For years the debate centered on whether pre-
                                                     
1. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT 
TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 2.3, at 8 
(2015) [hereinafter CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY], available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/ 
201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (finding the prevalence of arbitration 
agreements at over fifty percent market share for credit cards (fifty-three percent), prepaid cards (at 
least eighty-three percent), storefront payday loans (ninety-nine percent), and mobile wireless 
accounts (one hundred percent); eighty-six percent of private student-loan contracts studied 
contained arbitration agreements (as opposed to market share) (all figures rounded to nearest whole 
number)); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of 
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 882–
83 (2008) (examining select consumer contracts in mobile wireless providers, credit card 
companies, cable providers, and stock-trading services and finding seventy-five percent of the 
consumer contracts in the sample had arbitration clauses); Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical 
Study of Predispute Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 
34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 653–54 (2012) (finding that twenty-four percent of social 
networking sites included an arbitration agreement in their terms of service or privacy policy; of 
these about forty-six percent were mandatory arbitration agreements); Peter B. Rutledge & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2013) (finding that 
95.1% of the dollar value of credit card loans (a proxy for market share) was subject to credit card 
arbitration agreements, but 17.4% of issuers used arbitration agreements in their credit card 
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dispute binding arbitration imposed on parties with less bargaining 
power (e.g., consumers and employees) was fair as an alternative forum. 
A corollary debate focuses on whether the class-action waiver/arbitration 
clause is inherently unfair and unenforceable under state 
unconscionability doctrines or vindication of statutory rights theories 
when plaintiffs assert low-value claims that an individual would not 
rationally pursue. In recent cases, most recently American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant
2
 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
3
 the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly decided that arbitration is an adequate 
alternative forum for litigants—even those who must proceed 
individually with low-value claims.
4
 Thus, the Supreme Court has 
signaled that arbitration in the consumer, employment, and even health-
care arenas is here to stay, unless eroded by legislative amendment or 
regulatory action.
5
 The benefits and detriments of class-waiver 
                                                     
agreements as of 2009; since 2009 the market share has decreased as a result of the National 
Arbitration Forum (NAF) settlement described below and an antitrust settlement with card issuers). 
2. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (rejecting argument that class arbitration is necessary 
to vindicate low-value statutory claims when expert costs are higher than projected individual 
recovery). 
3. 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
preempts California’s state-law rule prohibiting class-waivers because the rule “interferes” with 
arbitration by requiring class arbitration or class litigation ex post).  
4. Although the prevalence of arbitration agreements in consumer products may vary across 
product markets, see sources cited supra note 1, when arbitration agreements are present in 
consumer agreements, they almost always include a class-action/class-arbitration waiver. See, e.g., 
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.5, at 44 (for all product markets studied, over 
eighty-five percent of contracts with arbitration agreements had no-class provisions); Eisenberg et 
al., supra note 1, at 882–84 (finding that every consumer contract with an arbitration clause in the 
study had a class-arbitration waiver); Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 25 (reporting that forty-
three of forty-seven (ninety-two percent) credit card arbitration agreements informed cardholders 
they could not be a party to a class action in court if the dispute was governed by the arbitration 
agreement). 
5. If we were to obtain the data and level of transparency called for in this Article, the decision as 
to whether arbitration is a fair and adequate alternative forum in these contexts (e.g., no bargaining 
power, inferior resources) could be based on actual evidence instead of theoretical constructions. As 
for the arbitrability of medical-care claims, in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, __ U.S. 
__, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that the FAA preempts state law 
prohibiting agreements to arbitrate personal injury claims based on nursing home care, confirming 
that hospitals, doctors, and health care facilities can require pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. Id. 
at 1203. According to the American Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Healthcare Due Process 
Protocol, it will not arbitrate pre-dispute mandated arbitration agreements in disputes involving 
patients and a health-care provider. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, HEALTHCARE DUE PROCESS 
PROTOCOL 16 (1998), available at https://www.adr.org/cs/idcplg?IdcService=GET_FILE&dDoc 
Name=ADRSTAGE2025859&RevisionSelectionMethod=LatestReleased (“Consent to use an ADR 
process should not be a requirement for receiving emergency care or treatment. In disputes 
involving patients, binding forms of dispute resolution should be used only where the parties agree 
to do so after a dispute arises.”). 
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arbitration agreements to the consumer and to society are hotly 
contested. Even as this Article was prepared for publication, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) announced that it will 
propose a rule prohibiting class-action waivers in arbitration agreements 
for consumer financial products and requiring more transparency in 
individual arbitration awards.
6
 What becomes of this proposed rule will 
be decided over the course of the coming year,
7
 but the proposal 
demonstrates the opposition to class-waiver arbitration agreements and 
the importance of transparency and empirical data on the regulatory 
regime of arbitration versus class action. 
This Article suggests that the debate should move beyond the 
question of permissibility to the regulatory structures under which 
arbitration should operate.
8
 The conversation begins with the 
observation that each of the Supreme Court’s decisions and academics’ 
arguments are based almost entirely on theories of how arbitration 
should work rather than empirical data about how arbitration does 
work.
9
 While the body of empirical research to date is both useful in 
assessing consumer arbitration and growing, it also has significant 
                                                     
6. Richard Cordray, Prepared Remarks of CFPB Director Richard Cordray at the Arbitration 
Field Hearing, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Oct. 7, 2015), 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-cfpb-director-richard-cordray-at-
the-arbitration-field-hearing-20151007/. This drastic rule the CFPB proposes will undoubtedly 
mean that most consumer financial-services companies will cease offering arbitration agreements. 
This is unfortunate for the individual consumer who may have preferred a “business pays all” type 
of dispute resolution process rather than to retain the ability to participate as a class member.  
7. Any final rule issued by the CFPB regulating arbitration will not apply to any agreement 
entered into between the consumer and the financial entity within 180 days of the new rule’s 
effective date. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(d) (2012). The CFPB “contemplates setting an effective date of 30 
days after the rule is published.” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS ADVISORY 
REVIEW PANEL FOR POTENTIAL RULEMAKING ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 22 (2015), available 
at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-review-panel-packet-explaining-
the-proposal-under-consideration.pdf. This means any final rule will likely not have an effect until 
nearly 2017 or later, depending on how quickly the CFPB proposes its rule for comment.   
8. By “debate” I primarily reference two dialogues: (1) the dialogue between courts and underdog 
arbitration party-opponents in which unconscionability and vindication of statutory rights defenses 
were commonly raised, and (2) the policy debate between law-makers, lawyers, stakeholders, and 
academics as to the fairness of the adoption of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with class waivers 
through employment agreements and terms and conditions of product sales.  
9. I have argued that mandatory arbitration agreements, such as the one at issue in Concepcion, 
can actually result in a framework in which the consumer is better off. See Ramona L. Lampley, Is 
Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration 
Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
477, 512–18 (2009) (arguing that the consumer is actually better off in alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) in a corporation-pays-all type agreement with a premium for winning, such as the one at 
issue in Concepcion). 
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limitations.
10
 One limitation is that most of the empirical research to date 
is based on data from the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
11
 
which is a widely used arbitration administrator, but certainly not the 
only administrator. This use of this empirical evidence is rare in the 
Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence. For example, in Concepcion, 
Justice Scalia cited limited statistics from the AAA regarding 
dispositions of actions within an eight-month period in 2007 compared 
to disposition statistics for class arbitrations up to 2009 in his opinion 
describing arbitration as ill suited for class proceedings.
12
 Surely we can 
do better than an eight-month data set as evidence of the outcomes of 
individual arbitration. But this use of empirical evidence was unusual. 
Most decisions addressing the adequacy of arbitration as an alternative 
forum are based on no data, perhaps due to lack of comprehensive 
                                                     
10. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 11–14 (explaining the difficulty in obtaining 
statistically significant and empirically sound evidence to evaluate arbitration); Alexander J.S. 
Colvin, Employment Arbitration: Empirical Findings and Research Needs, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.–
Oct. 2009, at 6, 6 (“One problem for researchers has been the dearth of publicly available data on 
which to conduct empirical research that would help evaluate the arguments of both sides of the 
employment arbitration debate.”). The CFPB Arbitration Study and the Searle Civil Justice Institute 
(SCJI) Report on consumer arbitration are two recent empirical studies on the outcomes of 
arbitration of consumer financial products and consumer products, respectively. CFPB 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1; SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 (2009) [hereinafter 
SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY], available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc= 
ADRSTG_010205. Although those studies were based on the actual case files from the AAA, which 
is a superior analytical tool than data metrics, they were limited to AAA information. See discussion 
infra notes 190–98 and accompanying text. On the employment side, see, for example, CFPB 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 15 n.24 (collecting studies); Lisa B. Bingham, 
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 206–07 
(1997) (analyzing AAA commercial and employment cases for repeat-player effect); Alexander J.S. 
Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Colvin, Case Outcomes]; Alexander J.S. Colvin, 
Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. 
& EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 407 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Clarity] (relying on AAA data provided 
pursuant to California law for empirical evaluation of employment-arbitration outcomes); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical 
Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 45 (relying on AAA employment-
arbitration data); Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 777, 792 (2003) (study based on random sample of AAA employment-arbitration dispute 
awards). 
11. For example, many of the sources referenced in note 10, supra, rely on such data. See, e.g., 
CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 4; SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, 
supra note 10, at 37–38; Bingham, supra note 10, at 206–07; Colvin, Case Outcomes, supra note 
10; Colvin, Clarity, supra note 10, at 407; Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 10, at 45; Hill, supra note 
10, at 792. 
12. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011). 
10 - Lampley.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
1732 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1727 
 
research until recently.
13
 
This Article accepts two principles as a starting point: (1) Access to 
justice through the federal and state courts for many individual 
consumers or employees is unobtainable, and (2) my previously voiced 
position that in certain kinds of pre-dispute class-waiver arbitration 
agreements, the consumer/employee/plaintiff might be in as good a 
position, if not better off, as in the courts.
14
 The main arguments 
advanced against this suggestion that arbitration could be just as 
beneficial to the individual litigant (as opposed to class member) are: 
arbitrator bias, lack of judicial oversight, the lack of a written decision, 
potential confidentiality, and the demise of the class action. The first 
four of these are perpetuated from a general criticism about the lack of 
transparency in consumer arbitration. However, these flaws could be 
minimized by the adoption of a regulatory scheme designed to improve 
transparency. 
For example, arbitrator bias is theoretically presumed to stem, in part, 
from the repeat-player effect. This could occur at the individual 
arbitrator level or at the service provider level. Critics suggest that 
arbitrators may be consciously or unconsciously influenced by the fact 
that the corporate litigant is the paying party, and will not bring him or 
her repeat business if the arbitrator issues a decision or award that is not 
favorable to the business.
15
 This “don’t bite the hand that feeds you” 
prognosis has some basic logic to it, but does not necessarily indicate 
that all arbitrators have repeat-player bias. Much the same argument 
could be made of state court judges who accept campaign contributions 
from potential litigants. How are we to know if the repeat-player effect 
taints the fair administration of arbitral proceedings for “underdog” 
claims?
16
 We need transparency. 
At least some history tells us that bias is real and problematic. In 2009 
                                                     
13. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2304 (2013); 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), 
overruled by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.  
14. This is a view I have previously taken. See Lampley, supra note 9, at 512–18 (arguing that the 
consumer is actually better off in ADR in a corporation-pays-all type agreement with a premium for 
winning, such as the one at issue in Concepcion). 
15. Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684–85 (1996). 
16. I use the term “underdog” claims to encompass consumer and employee claims in which the 
non-business entity had little or no bargaining power in accepting the mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement. Because these arbitration agreements typically prevent participation as a 
member of a class, the disputant is forced to individually arbitrate his or her claim. For low-value 
claims, the rational disputant would forego the claim unless an incentive to pursue the claim is 
available. See Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110, overruled by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
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the Minnesota Attorney General’s office filed suit against the National 
Arbitration Forum (NAF)—the then leading debt collection arbitration 
forum.
17
 According to the allegations, the NAF purportedly held itself 
out as an impartial arbitration provider while having ties to key members 
of the debt collection industry.
18
 Within days, the NAF entered into a 
settlement with the Minnesota Attorney General that required it to cease 
arbitrating consumer debt collection cases.
19
 Increased transparency in 
the process will make it more likely that state attorneys general, the 
Department of Justice, the CFPB, and the public can monitor arbitration 
providers and ensure that the process is fair. 
As the example of arbitrator bias illustrates, many of the criticisms 
against underdog arbitration thrive because of the more general criticism 
that arbitration simply is not transparent. This lack of transparency 
means we cannot assess whether arbitration is fair for disputants with 
less bargaining power.
20
 Most arbitration disputes do not result in a 
published opinion and some underdog arbitrations are confidential.
21
 
Concepcion and Italian Colors both danced around this concept that 
individual arbitration is “fair” without expressly invoking the term or 
due process rights.
22
 But how are we to know if this largely opaque 
                                                     
17. Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at B8. 
18. Complaint at 1–2, State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
July 14, 2009) (on file with author). 
19. Consent Judgment, Nat’l Arbitration Forum, No. 27-CV-09-18550, 2009 WL 5424036 (July 
17, 2009).  
20. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 87 (2011) (“The presence of the public divests 
both the government and private litigants of control over the meanings of the claims made and the 
judgments rendered and enables popular debate about and means to seek revision of law’s content 
and application.”); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating 
System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of 
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 990–91 (2012) (acknowledging that 
parties may prefer to have an award that spells out the disposition of various claims and 
controversies as well as the rationale underpinning the decision). The AAA requires a statement of 
the reason for employment awards, and just last year began requiring a statement of the reason for 
consumer awards, as do some arbitration contracts. See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
21. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT 
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 62–63 (2010) [hereinafter FTC CONSUMER DEBT 
COLLECTION REPORT], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/ 
life-debt/debtcollectionreport_0.pdf (stating that reasoned opinions in consumer debt collection 
cases are rare, and must be requested by a party and often accompanied by a fee). This report is the 
culmination of extensive research by the FTC on consumer debt litigation and arbitration, including 
a 2007 public workshop to identify consumer problems and possible solutions, a 2009 report 
concluding that the debt collection system was in need of serious reform, and public roundtables in 
2009 in Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. bringing together numerous stakeholders in 
the issues. Id. at i–ii. The FTC also solicited and received public comments. Id. at ii.  
22. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–12 (2013); AT&T 
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process is fair, and hence, a truly adequate alternative forum? Professor 
Judith Resnik pointed out this problem, which she characterizes as a lack 
of “publicity”: “Lost is the ability to assess the qualities of the 
procedures and of decisionmakers and to evaluate whether asymmetries 
between disputants are taken into account.”23 As Professor Resnik 
recognizes, what is also lost is the extra benefit of publicity so that 
public initiatives can remedy wrongs that go unchecked when 
government enforcement is lacking.
24
 There is one other downside to 
arbitration’s secrecy—without open access to the complaint, or decision, 
it does not flag for other consumers a potential claim or a warning that 
there may be a problem with the manufacturer. This reduces the 
deterrent effect our court-based tort system has on manufacturers, 
retailers, and service providers. Similarly, in the employment context, 
the lack of publicity or transparency fails to advertise what may be 
widespread discriminatory practices. 
This Article advocates a tri-part solution to address these critiques: (1) 
Congress should amend the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to require 
that arbitral providers report data on the arbitration proceedings for 
consumer, employment, and health-care claims (whether this is a claim 
regarding the quality of care or an insurance dispute) and states should 
enact an equivalent uniform reporting requirement;
25
 (2) the FAA and 
state arbitration laws should require that arbitrators “publish” online a 
short statement of the decision; and (3) the FAA and state counterparts 
should require data reporting by the business entities that require pre-
dispute agreements from clients, customers, and employees. 
The first piece of the proposal has already been adopted by three 
states and the District of Columbia.
26
 Part III.A of this Article discusses 
the commonalities of those state reporting requirements and includes 
suggestions for improvement. With respect to the second piece of the 
proposal, the “statement of decision” is intentionally not described as an 
“opinion.” It must set forth quite simply the applicable law and the facts 
as applied to that law. The third piece of the proposal requires a baseline 
of reporting by the business entities that impose the pre-dispute 
                                                     
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747–48, 1751–53 (2011). 
23. Resnik, supra note 20, at 132. 
24. Id. 
25. See infra Part III.A.2 for specific data field recommendations.  
26. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE § 16-
4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess.). 
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arbitration on their stakeholders, whether it is employee or consumer. 
This third proposal is likely to be the most controversial, but as a matter 
of marketing, I am surprised it has not already occurred organically. If, 
as AT&T argued in Concepcion, individual binding arbitration is just as 
fair to the consumer as proceeding collectively in court, why has AT&T 
not published yearly statistics on the consumer arbitration results? My 
proposal would simply make baseline reporting on the corporate-user 
level mandatory, much as companies must provide required information 
in routine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, in order 
to avail themselves of this alternative private forum. 
As an arbitration supporter myself, I am well aware that criticisms of 
this proposal will abound. The critique will be that the entire design of 
arbitration is to be streamlined, less expensive, and swift. A regime that 
makes arbitration more similar to litigation thwarts those goals. The 
response is that simple data reporting and the requirement of a statement 
of decision by a person already hired (and paid) as an industry expert 
will not result in this parade of horribles that will certainly be voiced. 
Litigation is expensive and protracted due to multiple factors, including 
extensive e-discovery, motions practice, depositions, and hearings. 
Arbitration still need not entail those features to the extent required by 
the state and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Disputes still could 
be resolved based on little discovery or “on the papers.” The requirement 
that the seasoned “expert”—paid by the parties (or rather the corporate 
entity under the ideal arbitration agreement) to adjudicate the dispute—
issue a short statement of the rule and application of law should result in 
a negligible cost increase.
27
 And the data required by my proposal is 
information that is usually already gathered during the proceedings; it 
would necessitate only further completion of a form by the neutral 
selected. 
Nonetheless, the proposal described in this Article is not a panacea for 
the funneling of consumer or employment claims to individual 
arbitration. Collecting data and heightening transparency cannot “prove” 
that arbitration is fair as compared to litigation, whether litigation 
proceeds individually or as part of a class.
28
 And even with more 
                                                     
27. Although it may put some arbitrators’ expertise to the test, which is part of the point. 
28. For example, “[a] business win-rate of over ninety percent in arbitration does not show 
arbitration is unfair if the win-rate for comparable cases in court is similar.” SEARLE INSTITUTE 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 9; see also PETER B. RUTLEDGE, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM, ARBITRATION – A GOOD DEAL FOR CONSUMERS 11 (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811133 (“Studies of debt collection actions in major cities reveal that the 
lender typically wins between 96% and 99% of the time, right in line with the lender win-rate data 
cited in the Public Citizen Report.”). 
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uniform reporting requirements, there will almost certainly be challenges 
in collecting and interpreting the data to understand individual consumer 
arbitration more fully.
29
 But gathering this data in a uniform format will 
provide a useful tool for assessing the benefits of individual arbitration 
versus consumer litigation. 
This Article begins with an analysis of the recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that embraces arbitration as an alternative forum, even for 
low-value or underdog claims. Part II addresses criticisms of pre-dispute 
arbitration, their validity, and their sources. In this Part, I emphasize that 
arguments both for and against mandatory “underdog” arbitration are 
grounded almost solely in theory, not on empirical evidence. Drawing on 
existing empirical research and assessment of current state laws, I 
propose a uniform reporting requirement for arbitration providers, a 
reporting requirement for corporate players, and a uniform requirement 
that arbitrators issue a statement of decision. In this proposal I address 
more fully the cost/benefit analysis of my tri-part proposal, and explain 
why the benefits, in enabling transparency, assessing fairness, and 
preserving publicity, outweigh the costs it will impose. Part III addresses 
some inherent weaknesses in data collection and assessment. Ultimately, 
I conclude that the benefits that will inure from heightened transparency 
justify implementation of this proposal, despite some weaknesses that 
persist. 
I. WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT THERE 
By now, it is no secret that the Supreme Court has given prospective 
litigants a nudge, or indeed a shove, to the world of alternative dispute 
resolution. This Part provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s 
development of the “national policy favoring arbitration.”30 In 1925 
Congress passed the FAA, which states that arbitration agreements 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”31 In Prima 
                                                     
29. The Searle Institute Arbitration Study noted data inconsistencies in amounts claimed and 
awarded in AAA datasets input by AAA case managers and the findings made in the same case files 
by SCJI analysts. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 40. This study 
attributed the inconsistencies to the AAA case managers combining compensatory damages with 
attorneys’ fees, interest, punitive damages, and other damages. Id.  
30. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); see also Myriam 
Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 394–98 (2005) (chronicling the consumer-product arbitration agreement); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635–46 
(2005) (discussing mandatory binding arbitration in the United States). 
31. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
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Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,
32
 the Court held 
implicitly that the FAA preempts state law in federal courts, beginning 
the FAA preemption doctrine.
33
 It extended FAA preemption to state 
courts in Southland Corp. v. Keating.
34
 One year after Keating, the Court 
reversed longstanding federal doctrine when it held that the FAA applied 
to—and rendered enforceable—pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 
antitrust claims. In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc.,
35
 the Court explained that 
[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only 
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum. It trades the procedures . . . of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
36
 
After Mitsubishi Motors, the sole limitations on enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements were (1) those that arise under state-law 
grounds, such as duress, fraud, or unconscionability;
37
 (2) when the 
prospective litigant is deprived of vindicating its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum;
38
 and (3) in cases in which Congress has 
                                                     
32. 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
33. Id. at 400 (holding that issue of contract validity (as opposed to arbitration clause validity) is 
for the arbitrator to decide, not the courts, and that this rule of “national substantive law” governs 
even in the face of contrary state rule); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11–12 
(1984) (relying on Prima Paint as implying that the substantive rules of the FAA apply in state and 
federal courts). 
34. 465 U.S. 1, 8, 12 (1984) (preempting a state statute requiring judicial, rather than arbitral 
resolution). 
35. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).   
36. Id. at 628. 
37. The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity” for the revocation of any contract, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), which refers to 
general state contract law defenses. Justice Thomas interprets this clause of the FAA as limited to 
only state contract defenses that concern the formation of the agreement, such as fraud, duress, or 
mutual mistake. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1755 
(2011). 
38. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 (“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its 
remedial and deterrent function.”). Justice Scalia all but eviscerated the “effective vindication” 
doctrine in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), 
when he characterized the quoted language as dicta. Id. at 2310. In footnote two, Scalia rejected the 
characterization of the “effective vindication” doctrine as part of Mitsubishi Motor’s holding:  
Contrary to the dissent’s claim . . . the Court in Mitsubishi Motors did not hold that federal 
statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as the claimant may effectively vindicate his 
rights in the arbitral forum. The Court expressly stated that, “at this stage in the proceedings,” 
it had “no occasion to speculate” on whether the arbitration agreement’s potential deprivation 
of a claimant’s right to pursue federal remedies may render that agreement unenforceable.  
Id. at 2310 n.2 (citations omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19).  
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specifically restricted statutory claims from arbitration.
39
 
In the years following Mitsubishi Motors, the Court upheld arbitration 
agreements arising out of other protective statutes such as section 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
40
 the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),
41
 and section 12(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933.
42
 The Court’s pro-arbitration stance extended to age 
discrimination claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
43
 
despite the plaintiff’s argument that arbitration would not serve the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act’s (ADEA) broad purposes without 
the class device or the broad equitable relief afforded through the courts. 
Then in 1996 in Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto,44 the Court held that 
the FAA’s command that arbitration agreements be placed on the “same 
footing” as other contracts preempted a Montana law that would render 
unenforceable arbitration agreements unless notice of the agreement was 
typed in underlined letters on the first page of the contract.
45
 
Then came Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,
46
 a 
classic case of an underdog plaintiff contesting an adhesion pre-dispute 
                                                     
39. See, e.g., Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (“No contrary Congressional command requires 
us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here.”); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, __ U.S. __, 
132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (“[The FAA] requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according 
to their terms . . . even when the claims at issue are federal statutory claims, unless the FAA’s 
mandate has been ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’” (internal citations omitted)); 
Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627 (holding that “it is the congressional intention expressed in 
some other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to which 
agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable”). For example, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act precludes pre-dispute exclusive arbitration agreements in 
residential-loan contracts. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (2012). Other examples include 9 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) 
(pre-dispute arbitration agreements not enforceable for commodity whistleblower claims); 10 
U.S.C. § 987(e)(3), (f)(4) (2012) (rendering arbitration agreements unenforceable for military 
members and families for payday loans and consumer-credit contracts, other than residential 
mortgages and car loans); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (precluding automobile-dealer franchise pre-
dispute arbitration agreements); and 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (2012) (precluding waiver of rights and 
remedies of whistleblower claims under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including by pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement). See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
161, 199 n.92 (2015). 
40. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987). 
41. Id. 
42. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
43. 500 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1991). 
44. 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
45. Id. at 683, 687 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). Requiring 
conspicuous notice of agreements to arbitrate, particularly in the consumer or employment context, 
may indeed be a laudable goal. To be sure, the prominence of the arbitration agreement is a factor in 
the unconscionability analysis. Congress could easily accomplish this goal by permitting states to 
require the notice to be conspicuous in the special situations of “underdog” claims.   
46. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
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arbitration agreement. The Green Tree plaintiff was a consumer 
purchaser of a mobile home.
47
 She financed the transaction through a 
financial services company.
48
 She alleged the defendant failed to 
disclose a finance charge in violation of federal law.
49
 She also argued 
that the arbitration agreement should not be enforceable because its 
silence as to cost allocation posed a risk that high arbitration costs would 
prohibit her from vindicating those federal rights.
50
 Consistent with its 
pro-arbitration trajectory, the Court held that Randolph had not met the 
requisite level of proof to show that the existence of potentially large 
arbitration costs would preclude her from “effectively vindicating her 
federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”51 
During this same time frame, the 1990s and throughout the 2000s, the 
presence of arbitration agreements in the sale of consumer products and 
employment agreements was on the rise. During this twenty-year time 
frame, one notable feature became dominant—the presence of the class 
waiver.
52
 The enforceability of the class-waiver arbitration agreement 
was hotly contested in the lower federal courts and state courts primarily 
on two grounds: unconscionability and the “effective vindication” 
doctrine stemming from Mitsubishi Motors.
53
 For over a decade many 
courts treated the class waiver as inherently unconscionable. California 
courts even applied the “Discover Bank rule” which rendered 
unenforceable arbitration agreements in which 
the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a 
setting in which disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is 
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
                                                     
47. Id. at 82. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 84. 
50. Neither party disputed the arbitration clause’s applicability to all claims, even statutory 
claims, arising under the contract, and Ms. Randolph did not contend that the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) evinces a clear intention by Congress to preclude waiver of judicial (or class) remedies. Id. 
at 90. 
51. Id.  
52. For a history of the evolution of the class-waiver arbitration agreement, see, for example, 
Gilles, supra note 30, at 394–98; Jeffrey A. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass 
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 383, 398 (2008) (“The practical consequences of the new legal era 
were significant. Arbitration left the province of particular business guilds or commercial 
environments and shifted to a massive privatization of the adjudicatory function. . . . [A] genre of 
new arbitration arose, in which arbitration agreements were essentially imposed upon a large, 
general class of consumers and workers.”).  
53. See, e.g., Lampley, supra note 9, at 503–10 (analyzing the evolution and use of arbitration 
agreements in consumer products and services). 
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carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money.
54
 
But in very recent cases, the Court has all but eviscerated these defenses. 
First, in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
55
 the Court held that a 
“delegation clause”—granting the arbitrator the exclusive authority to 
decide the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself, instead of a 
court—was enforceable.56 Traditionally, attacks on the validity of a 
contract as a whole were issues for an arbitrator to decide, but attacks on 
the gateway issue of enforceability of the arbitration agreement were for 
the court.
57
 The Rent-A-Center Court held that this traditional division of 
gateway issues could be modified by contractual agreement, delegating 
authority to the arbitrator to determine issues of arbitration agreement 
enforceability.
58
 
Then came AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which the Court 
held that the FAA preempted the aforementioned “Discover Bank rule,” 
because it “stands as an obstacle” to the FAA’s objectives.59 The Court 
rejected Justice Breyer’s dissenting argument that “class proceedings are 
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip 
through the legal system” because even if that result is desirable, states 
cannot require it through a procedure inconsistent with the FAA.
60
 The 
Court actually went so far as to declare nonconsensual class arbitration 
as inconsistent with the FAA because it sacrifices informality for slower, 
more costly, and more complex decisions that carry greater risks.
61
 And 
the Court made a point of observing the specific consumer-friendly 
tenets of the AT&T agreement, including AT&T’s incentive payment of 
$7500 and double attorney’s fees if the claimant received an arbitral 
award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer. The district court 
found that the plaintiffs were actually “better off” under this arbitration 
agreement than as a member of a class, “which ‘could take months, if 
not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim 
                                                     
54. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005), overruled by AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
55. 561 U.S. 63 (2010). 
56. Id. at 72–73. 
57. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). 
58. A party could raise a defense to the enforcement of the delegation clause under Rent-A-
Center, which would still raise a gateway issue of enforceability for the courts, but a general attack 
on the arbitration agreement itself would be subject to the otherwise enforceable delegatory-
arbitration agreement. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72. 
59. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 1751–53. 
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for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.’”62 And the Ninth 
Circuit stated that aggrieved consumers who filed claims were 
“‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be made whole.”63 While Concepcion 
could not have wholly removed unconscionability as a general contract 
defense to a truly one-sided arbitral agreement, it did significantly limit 
the contours under which that defense could be asserted. No longer is the 
argument that arbitration agreements are unfair because they remove the 
class device valid. This is true even for traditionally “underdog” claims. 
Following Concepcion, many observers claimed that the consumer 
class action was dead.
64
 But for federal statutory claims, opponents of 
the class-arbitration waiver found cover in Mitsubishi Motor’s 
“vindication of statutory rights” doctrine. As applied to low-value 
claims, the theory went that it would be irrational to pursue an individual 
claim through arbitration when the cost of arbitration outweighed the 
potential recovery. Hence, the removal of the class device precluded the 
litigant’s opportunity to vindicate statutory rights. Two years after 
Concepcion, the Court struck a deathblow to this argument in American 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.
65
 Although Italian Colors did 
not involve a typical “underdog” claim, it did involve the claims of 
individual small business owners against the monolithic American 
Express. The claims of those small business owners resembled underdog 
claims because the merchants had no negotiating power and were 
allegedly coerced into “take it or leave it” agreements with American 
Express. The small business-owner merchants wanted to sue American 
Express for antitrust violations based on American Express’s alleged 
improper tying agreements, by which American Express required a 
merchant to accept its credit card if a merchant was going to accept the 
more lucrative charge card.
66
 But they wanted to proceed collectively. 
And they had each signed agreements requiring them to arbitrate 
individually. The merchants claimed that due to exorbitant expert fees 
needed to prove their antitrust claims, it would be too expensive to bring 
these claims individually in arbitration. Thus, the merchants argued, 
                                                     
62. Id. at 1753 (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 
5216255, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 
849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740). 
63. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Laster, 584 F.3d at 856 n.9). 
64. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 39, at 199 (predicting that after Concepcion and Italian 
Colors, businesses will adopt class waivers “en masse against consumers and employees” insulating 
themselves from class liability). 
65. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2304 (2013).   
66. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig. (Amex I), 554 F.3d 300, 307–08 (2d Cir. 2009).  
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depriving them of the class device prohibited vindication of their rights 
under the federal antitrust statute.
67
 
The Court disagreed, holding that the vindication of statutory rights 
“exception” applies only to the “prospective waiver of a party’s right to 
pursue statutory remedies.”68 The class-action waiver did not eliminate 
the right to pursue that remedy.
69
 As the Court succinctly put it, “the fact 
that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy 
does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”70 
But the Court’s opinion did not stop there. Justice Scalia’s 
characterization of the vindication of statutory rights doctrine as “judge-
made” “dictum” in Mitsubishi Motors calls into question the entire 
propriety of the vindication of statutory rights doctrine all together—at 
least if it were applied to render an arbitration agreement 
unenforceable.
71
 The Court recognized some situations in which the 
exception would be applicable—a provision in an arbitration agreement 
forbidding the assertion of statutory rights, for example, or filing and 
administrative fees that were so high such that access to the forum were 
prohibitively expensive.
72
 But those examples are the extremes and do 
not “save” the underdog claims that are irrational to pursue in light of 
arbitral costs. The Court reminded us that this issue was “all but 
resolv[ed]” in Concepcion: “We specifically rejected the argument that 
class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise 
slip through the legal system.’”73 The Court reiterated this holding as if 
to give strength to what could have been characterized as dicta in 
Concepcion. At least in the majority’s view, the argument that without 
the class device underdog claims will go unprosecuted is not a basis for 
refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement. 
The significance of these pro-arbitration decisions is magnified by 
other Roberts Court opinions. In Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. 
Brown,
74
 the Court easily overturned a decision by the West Virginia 
                                                     
67. Brief for Respondents at 2, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025, at 
*2. 
68. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).  
69. Id. at 2311. 
70. Id. (emphasis in original). 
71. Id. at 2310. 
72. Id. at 2310–11. 
73. Id. at 2312 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1753 (2011)).  
74. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (per curiam). 
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Supreme Court holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are 
unenforceable when they involve claims for personal injury or wrongful 
death against a nursing home.
75
 The per curiam decision merely 
reinforced FAA preemption doctrine, which was almost a foregone 
conclusion after Concepcion. But Marmet removed any doubt that pre-
dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable for personal injury 
claims, including medical malpractice claims.
76
 And as discussed above, 
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,
77
 the Court held that the same 
parties who agreed to arbitrate individually could not contractually 
enlarge the grounds for judicial review of the arbitral award.
78
 Hall 
Street also cast significant doubt on whether “manifest disregard of the 
law” remains a ground for vacating an arbitral award, because it is not 
specifically enumerated in section 10 of the FAA.
79
 The very narrow 
limitations for review or modification of an arbitral award, even if the 
parties have otherwise agreed, is an effective grant of authority from the 
Court to arbitrators to do what they will without interference by courts or 
the rule of stare decisis. 
The Court’s message conveyed through Concepcion and Italian 
Colors, and to a lesser degree, Marmet and Hall Street, is loud and clear. 
Arbitration is here to stay. This is true for consumer products and 
services. This is true for employer/employee claims. This is true for 
contracts in which the litigant has waived an opportunity to participate 
                                                     
75. Id. at 1203. In its scathing opinion, the Court wrote, “[t]he West Virginia court’s 
interpretation of the FAA was both incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the 
precedents of this Court.” Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court had based its holding on its errant 
conclusion that:  
Congress did not intend for the FAA to be, in any way, applicable to personal injury or 
wrongful death suits that only collaterally derive from a written agreement that evidences a 
transaction affecting interstate commerce, particularly where the agreement involves a service 
that is a practical necessity for members of the public.  
Id. (quoting Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 291 (W. Va. 2011)). 
76. Some state courts continue to apply state public policy grounds to invalidate arbitration 
agreements. See infra note 189. In an interesting twist on the issue of state law preemption, a 
California court of appeals held an arbitration agreement unenforceable under the contract language 
providing that if the state law rendered the class-arbitration waiver unenforceable, the entire 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable, because California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act 
(CLRA) precludes waiver of the class action. But to the extent the CLRA imposes class arbitration 
on parties without agreement, it is preempted by the FAA, which would mean the contractual class 
waiver does not offend state law. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 195 (Ct. App. 
2014). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review from the state court of appeals decision in 
March 2015. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 135 S. Ct. 1547 (2015). 
77. 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
78. Id. at 586.  
79. See Timothy Dyer, “Manifest Disregard” Alive and Well?, 17 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 82 
(2014). 
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as part of a class. This is even true for low-value arbitration claims. If 
the parties agreed to pre-dispute individual arbitration, absent some 
element of fraud, duress, or oppression, the Court would look favorably 
upon that agreement. And with this new era of mandated approval of 
arbitration agreements, it is time to accept that individual arbitration for 
“underdog” claims may be here to stay, and may even be a feasible 
system in which to operate. It is time for a new approach in which 
academics and lawyers work within the existing system and find a way 
to fashion an alternative dispute forum that works. 
II. INDIVIDUALIZED ARBITRATION OF UNDERDOG 
CLAIMS: SOME NOTEWORTHY CRITIQUES 
The cases discussed above show that, at least for now, the Supreme 
Court has fully embraced individual arbitration (through the class 
waiver) for low-value claims, even if it means that some claims will slip 
through the cracks. Yet the foundation of these cases is the theoretical 
idea that arbitration, as a court alternative, is adequately fair.
80
 The 
genesis of the Discover Bank rule at issue in Concepcion was due to a 
concern about fairness—the California Supreme Court held that it was 
inherently unfair, indeed unconscionable, for a party with superior 
bargaining power to “deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out 
of individually small sums of money” through an adhesion contract in 
which a consumer agreed to individual arbitration and waived the 
opportunity to participate as a member of a class.
81
 Certainly, even after 
Concepcion, states are free to determine whether arbitration agreements 
are subject to general contract law defenses, including the 
unconscionability defense.
82
 But states cannot apply their 
unconscionability doctrines in a way that stands as an obstacle to the 
FAA’s role.83 
Even beyond this preemption-based holding, however, the Supreme 
                                                     
80. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); see also 
Resnik, supra note 20, at 132 (“The Justices did not use the phrase ‘due process,’ . . . yet their 
judgments and disagreements entailed considering the quality of procedures, the asymmetries 
between disputants . . . , and the relevance of access and publicity, all of which are dimensions of 
the due process analyses set forth at the outset.”); id. at 93 (“[A]ll nine Justices assessed what 
fairness requires, in resources and in process, in or out of public courts.”). 
81. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1110 (Cal. 2005)).  
82. Id. at 1748 (“Although § 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, it 
does not suggest an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”). 
83. Id.  
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Court reiterated the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs were “better 
off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have 
been as participants in a class action . . . ‘which may merely yield an 
opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a 
few dollars.’”84 By couching its holding in terms of the utilitarian benefit 
to the plaintiff, the Court reaffirmed its theoretical assumption that 
arbitration is a perfectly fair alternative forum to litigation. 
That theoretical assumption is not new. It formed the bedrock of the 
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence beginning with 
Mitsubishi Motors. There the Court grounded its holding on the 
assumption that arbitration is a fair substitute for litigation: 
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to 
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It 
trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the 
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of 
arbitration.
85
 
This recognition of the fairness of the arbitral forum also percolates into 
the Court’s holding in Italian Colors. In rejecting the argument that class 
arbitration is necessary to prosecute small-value claims, the Court noted 
that “[t]he class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two 
contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue 
their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the 
class action for legal relief in 1938,”86 even though the economic effect 
of that result will mean that some individual, low-value claims will not 
be asserted individually.
87
 To drive home this point, the Court suggested 
that an arbitration provision forbidding the assertion of certain statutory 
rights would fail the “effective vindication” doctrine (to the extent it still 
exists), as would “perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached 
to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum 
impracticable.”88 Each of these examples involves elements that would 
render arbitration inaccessible and unfair as a litigation alternative. 
What is interesting about this underlying assumption that arbitration 
                                                     
84. Id. at 1753 (emphasis in original) (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS 
(AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T 
Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740). 
85. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
86. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
87. Id. at 2312 (rejecting argument that class arbitration is necessary to prosecute claims “that 
might otherwise slip through the legal system” (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753)).  
88. Id. at 2310–11. 
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is a fair alternative forum, even for underdog cases, is that the Supreme 
Court relied on no empirical evidence of outcomes suggesting that 
arbitration may be a fair alternative forum.
89
 It just seems, particularly 
on the face of consumer-friendly arbitration agreements like that at issue 
in Concepcion, that arbitration should be an adequate alternative forum 
to litigation. 
And herein lies the problem. Criticisms of pre-dispute individual 
arbitration abound. They are no more inconceivable than the idea that 
arbitration itself should be fair. But again, there is no evidence, no data, 
and no proof that confirms the existence of the criticisms. However, 
these criticisms highlight the need for more information about underdog 
arbitration agreements and outcomes. This Part of this Article will 
describe the main tenets of the most prominent criticisms of underdog 
arbitration: the class-waiver, arbitrator bias, lack of judicial oversight, 
lack of a written opinion, and the potential for confidentiality, many of 
which stem from the current regulatory system in which arbitration is 
not transparent. 
A. The Class-Waiver: Fair? Economical? Rational? Who Knows? 
One of the central problems raised by underdog arbitration is the 
almost uniform implementation of a clause requiring the consumer to 
waive the right to participate as a member of a class in court or in 
arbitration, i.e. the class waiver.
90
 Opponents of this type of clause argue 
that individual low-value claims will not be brought if the sole option is 
to bring those claims as an individual disputant in arbitration.
91
 The 
                                                     
89. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (citing AAA statistics for length of time toward dispute 
resolution, but offering no analysis of the prevalence of or outcomes data for low-value consumer 
claims).  
90. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 39, at 199 (predicting that after Concepcion and Italian Colors, 
businesses will adopt class waivers “en masse against consumers and employees,” insulating 
themselves from class liability); Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining 
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 825, 868 (2012) (“The pragmatic point is that rights will not in fact be vindicated if we ban 
collective action.” (emphasis in original)); Gilles, supra note 30, at 430 (“Allowing companies to 
simply opt out of exposure to collective litigation is no more defensible than a system in which 
corporations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to federal antitrust, securities, or civil 
rights laws.”); Resnik, supra note 20, at 127 (criticizing Concepcion and discussing the negative 
ramifications of the class waiver); Sternlight, supra note 30, at 1652 (“Given these benefits of class 
actions, it is clear that by eliminating the class action option, companies increase plaintiffs’ costs of 
pursuing a claim and thereby make it more difficult, if not impossible, for them to bring claims 
against the company.”).  
91. This was the central issue in Italian Colors. See supra notes 65–73, 81 and accompanying 
text.  
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proposal detailed in this Article will not fully address the fairness 
concerns raised by those who oppose the arbitration-with-class-waiver 
device, but the Article would miss a piece of the argument without at 
least raising the criticism. 
One point is worth making however—if we are to base our judgment 
of the class device trade-off with an assessment of dispute resolution 
economies, we simply do not have enough empirical information to 
conclude that the class waiver is a disservice to consumers. Indeed, a 
few points from the recent CFPB Arbitration Study show that for the 
time being, we should remain open to the idea that private dispute 
resolution on an individual basis may be an acceptable alternative to the 
imperfect class device. First, approximately sixty percent of the 
consumer financial products class actions filed ended in a non-class 
settlement or potential non-class settlement (i.e., withdrawal or dismissal 
by the plaintiff); approximately twelve percent (sixty-nine cases) 
reached an approved class-action settlement.
92
 This means that only a 
small portion of class actions that are filed result in any damages to the 
class-member consumer. Second, looking at a broader data set of 
consumer financial class-action settlements from 2008–2012, the 
average claims rate (claims made as a percentage of eligible class 
members) was low, twenty-one percent, with an eight percent median.
93
 
Thus, even when consumers obtain a settlement through the class device, 
they usually do not take the administrative steps to obtain the payout. 
Third, the consumer survey reflects that the dispute resolution process 
matters little to consumers in product selection (at least for credit cards) 
and that most consumers do not know if they can sue in court or are 
subject to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
94
 This 
                                                     
92. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 6.6.1, at 36–39, 40 fig.11. The CFPB Arbitration 
Study analyzed 562 consumer financial products putative class cases filed between 2010–2012; it 
identified an outcome for 478 of those cases by the study date. Id. at 36; id. § 6.5, at 16–18 
(describing methodology). Of those, none went to trial on the merits. Id. § 6.2.2, at 7. Ten were 
resolved against the company on motion, but only three (0.63%) of those were on a class-wide 
basis. Id. Additionally, of those ten resolved on the merits, seven were through default judgment. Id. 
§ 6.6.1, at 37–38. It is also worth noting that in 94 of the 562 class actions studied, companies 
moved to compel arbitration; 46 of such motions were granted in full or in part. Id. § 6.7.1, at 57–
58. 
93. Id. § 8, at 5; § 8.3.4, at 30. Assessing claims rate is difficult and has some limitations as 
acknowledged in the CFPB Study. Id. § 8.3.4, at 30 & n.49. Thus, the CFPB advises that these 
numbers should be viewed as a floor, because it may underestimate the actual rate. But the data 
reflect that consumers fail to capture much of the settlement relief offered. Id.  
94. Id. § 3.1, at 3 (finding that consumers did not volunteer “dispute resolution procedure” as a 
feature important to their decision to obtain the credit card they use most often, and this factor 
ranked lowest when the consumer was asked to identify important features out of a list). 
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information, while only representative of a small segment of the market, 
shows that consumers care little at the point of purchase about 
preserving the right to participate as a class, and perhaps more 
surprising, that the majority of consumers are not seeking class recovery 
even when it is available to them through a settlement decree. If the 
findings of the CFPB study regarding class action settlements are 
indicative of other markets, the class action is a flawed device for 
making the consumer whole. This makes the CFPB’s rule proposal to 
ban class waivers in consumer financial services arbitration agreements 
seem like a very drastic remedy, because it will effectively mean that 
financial entities cease providing for pre-dispute arbitration altogether.
95
 
In past writings, I have taken the view that business-funded 
arbitration with a litigation incentive can leave a consumer better off 
than he or she would be as a member of a class.
96
 The Supreme Court in 
Concepcion agreed (admittedly, without empirical information on 
arbitration outcomes).
97
 While a full discussion of the fairness concerns 
of the class waiver in consumer and employee arbitration agreements is 
beyond the scope of what can be adequately addressed in this regulatory 
proposal, increased data about underdog arbitration will inform that 
central debate in a much needed way. 
B. Bias: You Don’t Bite the Hand that Feeds You 
One of the main criticisms of arbitration in “underdog” claims is that 
the arbitrator or arbitral forum will be biased.
98
 As noted in the 
Introduction, nowhere is this more evident than in the claims lodged 
against the NAF for misrepresenting its neutrality in debt collection 
cases when it was affiliated with the New York hedge fund that also 
                                                     
95. Alan S. Kaplinsky, Our Thoughts on Director Cordray’s Arbitration Comments to the 
CFPB’s Consumer Advisory Board, CFPB MONITOR (Oct. 22, 2015), 
https://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2015/10/22/our-thoughts-on-director-cordrays-arbitration-comments-
to-the-cfpbs-consumer-advisory-board/. 
96. Lampley, supra note 9, at 512–18. An incentivizing clause typically promises a premium to 
the consumer and/or attorney’s fees if the consumer wins more in arbitration than the company’s 
last settlement offer. See, e.g., Netflix Terms of Use § 15(e), NETFLIX, 
https://www.netflix.com/TermsOfUse (last updated Sept. 15, 2014); Wireless Customer Agreement 
§ 2.2(4), ATT.COM, http://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement.html# 
disputeResolutionByBindingArb (last visited Oct. 22, 2015). 
97. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
98. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 30, at 1649 (“There are virtually an infinite number of ways 
in which a company, as the drafting party, can try to use an arbitration clause to gain the upper 
hand, including arbitrator selection, imposition of high costs, and limitation of remedies. While it 
would be wrong to suggest that most of these excesses are included in most arbitration clauses, 
some of them are quite common.”). 
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owned the country’s largest debt collection enterprises.99 The Minnesota 
Attorney General’s complaint alleged that the NAF worked closely with 
creditors to (1) encourage them to file arbitration claims as an alternative 
way to collect debt from consumers; (2) draft arbitration clauses, advise 
creditors on arbitration legal trends, and in some cases, help them draft 
claims to be filed against consumers; and (3) refer them to debt 
collection law firms, which then file arbitration claims against 
consumers in the Forum.
100
 The NAF ultimately settled this lawsuit, 
agreeing to stop accepting all consumer arbitrations.
101
 
The cases against the NAF, which used to be one of the top three 
arbitral forums in the United States, show that we cannot ignore the bias 
critique. In addition to bias due to financial ties, critics have long argued 
that with arbitration in which the employer or manufacturer is likely to 
be a repeat player, bias is structural.
102
 Employers, manufacturers, and 
retailers that enforce arbitration agreements are more likely to be “repeat 
players” than individuals, typically “one-shot” players. The CFPB 
Arbitration Study to Congress found that in consumer financial services 
and product disputes filed in 2010–2011, heavy repeat players 
“dominated” arbitration filings, constituting over eighty percent of case 
filings.
103
 The repeat player has an advantage in arbitrator selection 
because it is more familiar with the pool of potential arbitrators.
104
 
                                                     
99. Complaint, State v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, No 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 14, 
2009) (on file with author). 
100. Id.  
101. See Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2009, at B8. 
102. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 
936 (1979) (“A system of private selection would be disadvantageous to employees, since an 
arbitrator could improve his chances of future selection by deciding favorably to institutional 
defendants.”); see also Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If an 
arbitrator is likely to ‘lean’ in favor of an employer—something we have no reason to suspect—it 
would be because the employer is a source of future arbitration business.”); Lisa Blomgren Amsler, 
Combating Structural Bias in Dispute System Designs that Use Arbitration: Transparency, the 
Universal Sanitizer, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 32, 41 (2014) (concluding that adhesive 
arbitration bears indicia of structural bias because the disputant with superior economic control 
takes unilateral control over designing the dispute system for conflicts, and the arbitration 
agreements restrict recourse to the public civil justice system by typically removing collective 
action options).  
103. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.6.12, at 59. “Heavy” repeat players are those 
that appeared in four or more disputes from 2010–2012. Notably, “heavy” repeat consumer 
attorneys constituted forty-five percent of all filings, representing a trend in representation in this 
market. Id. 
104. See Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal 
Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1081, 1094 (2009). Bales & Irion dub this “submerged bias.” 
Id. 
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Empirical studies confirm that repeat players do tend to win more than 
one-shot players, at least in employment arbitration, but are inconclusive 
as to the cause for this effect.
105
 For example, simpler, faster procedures 
in arbitration may incentivize employees to bring lower-value claims.
106
 
Additionally, the availability of dispositive motions in pre-trial litigation 
practice may lead to the dismissal of weaker cases, reflecting a higher 
overall win rate at trial.
107
 The repeat player may also fare better in the 
process because it has had an opportunity to learn from prior procedures 
and improve its strategy, potentially settling weaker cases to pursue the 
stronger ones.
108
 Professor Elizabeth Hill coined this the “appellate 
effect” in her empirical study of two-hundred AAA employment 
cases.
109
 Professor Hill found that employers who repeatedly arbitrate 
did tend to win more frequently than one-shot players, but only two of 
the two hundred cases in her sample involved an arbitration involving 
the same company and arbitrator.
110
 The fact that only one percent of the 
parties were truly repeat players with each other means that arbitrator 
bias to the repeat party should not have demonstrated an effect. But Hill 
also found the win-loss record for those repeat employers who 
maintained an in-house dispute resolution program culminating in AAA 
                                                     
105. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 10, at 213 (finding that in repeat player cases, employees 
won something only sixteen percent of the time, compared with a sixty-three percent employee win 
rate overall, and that employees dealing with non-repeat players recovered an average of forty-eight 
percent of what they demanded, while employees dealing with repeat players recovered only eleven 
percent of what they demanded); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the 
Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
223, 239 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat Players] (“The repeat player effect is a cause for 
concern because in dispute resolution, sometimes the perception of fairness is as important as the 
reality. There is undeniably a repeat player effect in employment arbitration.”); Colvin, Clarity, 
supra note 10, at 412–17, 430, 434 (finding employee win rate of 32% against one-shot employers 
compared to 13.9% against repeat-player employers, and only 11.3% where the repeat-player 
employer was paired with a repeat arbitrator; finding 2% win rate when a repeat employer was 
paired with a repeat arbitrator against a pro se claimant). But there may be many factors contributing 
to these differential outcomes, such as the strength of the claims, the settlement rate, and award 
ratio. 
106. Colvin, Clarity, supra note 10, at 417. 
107. Id.  
108. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer 
Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 862 (2010) (collecting empirical studies and 
observing that “[o]verall, the empirical evidence tends to support the existence of a repeat-player 
effect, but suggests that the effect may be due to case screening by repeat businesses rather than 
repeat-arbitrator or repeat-player bias”); see also Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 105, at 
241; Colvin, Clarity, supra note 10, at 417–18. 
109. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., 
May–July 2003, at 9, 15. 
110. Id.  
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arbitration to be much higher than those repeat employers without an in-
house program.
111
 Thus, according to Hill, the “effect appears to be the 
result of the selection processes of large employers’ in-house dispute 
resolution programs, not merely the by-product of large employers’ 
repeat appearances at arbitration.”112 
Additionally, the arbitrator may be more inclined to side with the 
repeat player (even subconsciously) because that entity is likely to be the 
source of repeat business if a favorable decision is reached. Professor 
Jean Sternlight has dubbed this the “repeat provider” problem.113 The 
basic premise is that companies typically designate the provider of 
arbitration services in their arbitration agreement. Both the arbitrator and 
the provider will be paid for the services performed, the arbitrator will 
receive fees, and the provider will earn administrative fees or possibly 
even a percentage of the fees charged by the arbitrator.
114
 If the company 
is unhappy with a ruling from an arbitrator, or even a provider, the 
company has an incentive to refuse to select that particular arbitrator 
again, or, over time, to choose a different provider.
115
 As Professor 
David Schwartz points out, the more palpable concern “is that arbitrators 
will reduce their awards to increase their chances of being rehired by any 
future defendant.”116 Thus, “every defendant is functionally a repeat 
player” to the extent information about prior decisions is available to 
potential disputants.
117
 
Similarly, Professor Lisa Blomgren Amsler examined the common 
provisions of adhesive arbitration agreements under the “dispute system 
design” (DSD) framework.118 Amsler argues that “[s]tructural bias in 
                                                     
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Sternlight, supra note 30, at 1650 (explaining the “repeat provider” effect). 
114. Id.  
115. Id. (“Thus, charge the critics, providers have a financial incentive to make sure that the 
company is pleased with the results in arbitration.”). 
116. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 
1311 (2009) (emphasis in original); see also Larry J. Pittman, Mandatory Arbitration: Due Process 
and Other Constitutional Concerns, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 856 (2011) (“Arbitrators know that 
repeat players are more likely to choose them either if the arbitrator has ruled in the repeat players’ 
favor during past arbitrations or if they are likely to rule for them during future arbitrations.”). 
117. Schwartz, supra note 116, at 1311.  
118. Amsler, supra note 102, at 35–42. According to Amsler: 
DSDs generally fall into one of three categories: (1) a court, agency, or other third party 
designs it for the benefit of disputants (third party design); (2) two or more disputants subject 
to the system jointly design it (all disputants or parties design); and (3) a single disputant with 
stronger economic power designs it and imposes it on the other disputant (one party design).  
Id. at 40.  
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DSDs may depend on (1) who is designing the system; (2) what their 
goals are, and (3) how they have exercised their power.”119 Using this 
approach, she concludes that adhesive arbitration bears indicia of 
structural bias because the disputant with superior economic control 
takes unilateral control over designing the dispute system for conflicts; 
the arbitration agreements restrict recourse to the public civil justice 
system; and adhesive arbitration clauses typically remove collective 
action options.
120
 Like myself, Professor Amsler believes that the 
potential for bias presents the need for additional transparency.
121
 
Increased transparency can help the public evaluate the extent of repeat-
player bias, and help the public avoid arbitrators and arbitration service 
providers who have repeatedly found in favor of one repeat player. This 
perception that private, pre-dispute mandatory arbitration is subject to 
inherent bias is perpetuated by two other factors that lead to its wide 
criticism—the lack of judicial review and public distrust of the court 
alternative. 
C. Whatever Happened to Judicial Oversight? 
Mandatory arbitration with class waivers in underdog claims is also 
criticized for its finality.
122
 Members of Congress have expressed a 
similar concern, stating: “Mandatory arbitration undermines the 
development of public law because there is inadequate transparency and 
inadequate judicial review of arbitrators’ decisions.”123 Judicial review 
                                                     
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 41. 
121. See generally id. at 51–55 (arguing that “transparency can be a powerful tool for controlling 
the abuse of power” and offering examples of ways to achieve transparency).  
122. Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural Justice of Arbitration, 
59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47, 75 (2010) (proposing that courts review all awards in “mandatory arbitration 
for legal error under the manifest-disregard standard”); Pittman, supra note 116, at 872 (noting that 
“another way that courts can provide more protection to ensure fairness in arbitration is to engage in 
a more exacting level of judicial review of arbitration awards”); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules 
from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720–27 
(1999) (recognizing that arbitrators often do not “follow the law” and proposing that “[t]he Court 
must either reverse its decisions that claims arising under otherwise mandatory rules are arbitrable, 
or require de novo judicial review of arbitrators’ legal rulings on such claims”); Nancy A. Welsh, 
Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural 
Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 207 (2012) (“[J]udicial deference to arbitrators and the outcomes 
they produce becomes especially worrisome when arbitration draws its efficacy from the 
enforcement power of the state and the arbitrators’ and arbitral organization’s role is due to their 
special relationship with just one of the parties, usually the more powerful repeat player.”). 
123. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 878, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013). 
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of an arbitral award is very narrow.
124
 The finality of the arbitral award 
leads to public distrust and criticism among consumer or employee 
advocates. 
Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA prescribe the exclusive grounds for 
vacating or modifying an arbitral award which,
125
 according to the Court 
in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., cannot even be modified by 
agreement of the parties.
126 This limited review “maintain[s] arbitration’s 
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”127 Otherwise the 
perceived simplicity of arbitration would become “merely a prelude to a 
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.”128 
Under Section 10 of the FAA, the sole grounds for vacating an 
arbitral award are when there was evident corruption, fraud, or undue 
means in the procurement of the award or in the arbitrators themselves; 
when the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or failed to make a “mutual, 
final, and definite award” on the matter; or when the arbitrators are 
“guilty of misconduct” in procedural matters such as refusing to hear 
evidence or postpone a hearing.
129
 
Notably, the first two grounds speak to corruption, undue means, or 
bias. But absent the flagrant bribery charge, how can the appealing 
                                                     
124. Even when a court agrees to hear a review of an arbitral award under the very limited 
grounds set forth in notes 129 and 133, infra, “courts overturn only about 10% of arbitration awards 
reviewed under the [FAA].” Lindsay Melworm, Biased? Prove It: Addressing Arbitrator Bias and 
the Merits of Implementing Broad Disclosure Standards, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 431, 
441 (2014) (citing Platt W. Davis III, Nondisclosure of Arbitrator Conflicts and the “Evident 
Partiality” Standard, CPA J., June 2004, at 54, 55).  
125. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2012). 
126. 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008). Hall Street was a bit of an anomalous result in the arbitration 
world, where although almost everything can be negotiated by contract, the grounds for judicial 
review cannot. Id. Of course, the Court hinted that there may be some leeway around the narrow 
scope of review based on the FAA under state statutes, or even based on the Court’s inherent case-
management power under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, id. at 590–92, and parties could 
contract around this altogether by providing for arbitral review of an award that is egregious by 
some metric.  
127. Id. at 588. 
128. Id.  
129. Section 10 provides that the sole grounds for vacating an arbitral award are:  
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon 
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the 
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, 
final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4). 
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litigant ever prove bias? What is notable about the second two grounds is 
what is lacking—judicial review for an arbitral decision based on a 
manifest disregard of the law or clear abuse of discretion. Under the 
grounds as given, an award cannot be vacated even if it ignores stare 
decisis or mistakes the facts presented. Further, Hall Street casts 
significant doubt on whether “manifest disregard of the law” remains a 
ground for vacatur, because it is not specifically enumerated in section 
10.
130
 Thus, even under the “exceeds powers” provision of section 10(4), 
the Court has held that the party seeking award vacatur “bears a heavy 
burden” because a showing of error, “even a serious error,” will not 
provide grounds for vacating the award.
131
 It is only when the arbitrator 
acts outside his “contractually delegated authority” that this ground 
permits vacating the award.
132
 
Section 11 mitigates section 10 somewhat by providing that awards 
may be modified in certain circumstances. Awards may be modified if 
there is evident miscalculation or an evident material mistake 
surrounding the description of a person, thing, or property.
133
 Also under 
section 11, awards can be modified if the arbitrator based an award on a 
matter not submitted to arbitration (unless it is a matter not affecting the 
merits) or when the award’s form is imperfect in a way not affecting the 
merits.
134
 But even under section 11, a decision cannot be reversed if 
wrongly decided provided that the arbitrator did not engage in fraud, 
misconduct, corruption, was not biased, and acted within his or her 
powers. 
Although the veritable lack of appeal from arbitration is often 
criticized, the decision to appeal a court-resolved case is often an 
economic decision, not a guarantee. Professor David Schwartz estimates 
the federal appeal rate to be one appeal for every fourteen cases.
135
 
                                                     
130. See Dyer, supra note 79. 
131. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, __U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2068 (2013). 
132. Id. (quoting E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)). 
133. Section 11 provides for review:  
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material 
mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award. 
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a 
matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted. 
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. 
9 U.S.C. § 11. 
134. Id.  
135. Schwartz, supra note 116, at 1281 (“To the extent that arbitration is faster and cheaper than 
litigation, the restrictions on appeal are undoubtedly a factor, but one that is all too easily 
exaggerated.”). 
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While the lack of judicial appeal troubles consumer-rights and 
employee-rights proponents, there is some evidence to suggest that 
defendants fare better on appeal from court trials than plaintiffs, 
meaning that consumer plaintiffs may not benefit from more liberal 
grounds for arbitral appeal.
136
 While the proposal below will not entirely 
cure the concern about limited judicial oversight of arbitration awards, 
requiring detailed data reporting about arbitration outcomes and a 
written statement of decision will inform us as to how strong of a 
criticism the lack of judicial oversight is. Are arbitrators engaging in 
manifest disregard of the law? Even if they are, requiring a written 
statement of decision should curb abuse. To what extent would an 
increased route of judicial appeal cure fairness concerns? To answer 
these questions we need to know more about what is occurring in 
individualized arbitration. 
D. Preserving the Rule of Law 
One other problem with widespread mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
of consumer claims is the erosion of the rule of law.
137
 Arbitration 
typically requires no written, reasoned decision.
138
 This is perpetuated by 
the lack of judicial review and by the desire to avoid unnecessary delay 
and expense in a process that by its nature should be streamlined and 
cost-effective.
139
 The grand sphere of power given to private arbitrators 
                                                     
136. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil 
Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 948 (2002) 
(“Defendants that appealed their losses after trial obtained reversals at a 28% rate, while losing 
plaintiffs succeeded in only 15% of their appeals, with the spread increasing to 31% and 13% for 
appeals from jury trials.”). 
137. Sternlight, supra note 30, at 1661 (“Even if it could be shown that mandatory arbitration 
were beneficial for many or potentially all consumers and employees who had claims, some argue it 
would still be detrimental to society in that it curtails the use of public (sometimes jury) trials and 
eliminates the development of public precedent.”). 
138. MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., 1 DOMKE ON COMMERICAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 34:7, at 34-18 (3d ed. 2015) (“Arbitrators are not 
required to state the reasons for their award, and commercial arbitration awards, unlike labor 
awards, are rarely accompanied by written opinions.” (citations omitted)); see also FTC CONSUMER 
DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 62–63 (“Arbitrators issue awards at the conclusion of 
the proceeding, but they are not required to accompany their awards with an opinion setting forth a 
statement of the law and an application of the law to the facts.”). What the FAA does require is a 
final and definite award. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). 
139. See Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 529 (1997) (“It is a 
familiar enough proposition that an arbitrator’s freedom from the need to explain or justify his 
award is closely linked to his lack of accountability in terms of judicial review: The naked award 
that is the norm in domestic commercial arbitrations can be explained as much by a desire to 
insulate decisions from judicial scrutiny as by any desire to avoid the delay or added expense that 
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with no requirement to follow stare decisis, no requirement of a public 
decision, and virtually nonexistent concern about reversal, feeds into the 
concern that the system fosters bias. As Professor Resnik put it: 
“[P]rivate dispute resolvers are left to do as they wish . . . . [T]he public 
face of private dispute resolution largely depends on what providers 
decide to put forth.”140 The lack of a written opinion was one of the main 
tenets behind the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, which 
stated that “[m]andatory arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil 
rights and consumer rights because it is not transparent. While the 
American civil justice system features publicly accountable decision 
makers who generally issue written decisions that are widely available to 
the public, arbitration offers none of these features.”141 
In contrast, courts are transparent. Filings and hearings are generally 
open to the public. Although juries do not issue reasoned decisions, their 
verdicts are public.
142
 Judicial opinions are published and even the 
unpublished opinions are accessible. This transparency informs the 
parties and the public regarding how the law is both interpreted and 
applied.
143
 The decisions send a signal to the public about the merits of 
potential cases and the likelihood of a damages award or attorney 
general action. Public decisions also serve as a guide to future decision-
makers that may be binding, or may be merely persuasive, but at least 
                                                     
written opinions would entail.”). 
140. Resnik, supra note 20, at 108 (acknowledging that California has a requirement that 
arbitrators “‘collect, publish . . . , and make available to the public’ information about parties, 
categories of disputes, time to disposition, and outcomes”) (alteration in original) (citing CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2011)). Under this 2002 enactment, the AAA complies by providing 
quarterly reports including nationwide data. See also D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 
16, 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Providers do not, 
however, provide comprehensive data. See CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND 
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 1281.96 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print_Aug_6.pdf. 
141. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(6) (2009). 
142. Arbitration, while private, is not automatically confidential. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the 
Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2006) (stating arbitration is private 
in that it is a closed process, but it is not confidential because information revealed during the 
process may become public). Unless the parties agree otherwise, or the arbitrator provider requires 
confidentiality, there is no reason why arbitral awards cannot become public and reported by the 
press just as are verdicts. 
143. See Sternlight, supra note 30, at 1662 (“[O]ur public court hearings educate the public and 
potential wrongdoers as to how the law is being interpreted, thereby deterring potential wrongdoers 
from violating the law, educating victims as to their rights, and inviting the public to take action to 
help reform the law should it not be satisfied with public results.”). 
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are present.
144
 This social good is lost when decision-making is 
privatized and not public as it often is in arbitration. 
The arbitration industry response to these criticisms seems to validate 
the critique. The AAA, one the nation’s leading arbitration providers for 
dispute resolution, recently imposed the requirement that “[t]he award 
shall provide the concise written reasons for the decision unless the 
parties all agree otherwise” in consumer disputes.145 It has had a similar 
rule for employment disputes since 2009.
146
 The rule requiring written 
reasons for arbitral decisions is very new—it became effective 
September 1, 2014—and appears to still be somewhat at odds with 
Principle 15 of the AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol, which 
conditions the provision of a “brief written explanation of the basis of 
the award” on a party request.147 The comments accompanying 
Consumer Due Process Protocol Principle 15 note the “tension between 
the desire for confidentiality in arbitration . . . and the need to provide 
Consumers access to information regarding arbitrators” and arbitration 
administrators.
148
 The tension is in the default rule. Under the Due 
Process Protocol the default is to provide a written explanation of the 
award on party request; under the Consumer Arbitration Rules, the 
default is to provide “concise written reasons” for the award unless the 
parties agree otherwise.
149
 Notably the AAA may choose to publish an 
award rendered under these Rules; however, the names of the parties and 
witnesses will be removed from awards that are published, unless a party 
agrees in writing to have its name included in the award.
150
 
The Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services’ (JAMS) Minimum 
                                                     
144. See Mark Edwin Burge, Without Precedent: Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial 
Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 143, 176 (2013) (advocating scaling back the 
predominance of the stare decisis model in legal pedagogy due to the growth of administrative law 
and arbitration decisions and arguing that arbitrators need not even follow the law). 
145. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 27–28, R. 43 (2014) 
[hereinafter CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES], available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty 
?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased. The new rules were effective 
September 1, 2014. 
146. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 29, R. 39(c) (2009), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/ 
UCM/ADRSTG_004362. 
147. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 3, Principle 15.3 (1998) 
[hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL], available at https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF 
?doc=ADRSTG_005014 (“At the timely request of either party, the arbitrator should provide a brief 
written explanation of the basis for the award.”). 
148. Id. at 31 (providing reporter’s comments to Principle 15).  
149. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 145, at 27–28, R. 43. 
150. Id. at 28, R. 43(c).  
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Standards of Procedural Fairness in consumer arbitration requires that 
the award “provide a concise written statement of the essential findings 
and conclusions on which the award is based.”151 JAMS has a similar 
requirement for employment cases.
152
 As noted above, the NAF no 
longer accepts consumer arbitration disputes. 
Additionally, corporate imposers of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
are beginning to see the usefulness of a written decision requirement. 
For example, the Netflix Arbitration Agreement (which is 
inconspicuously nestled in Paragraph 15 of its Terms of Use) requires 
the arbitrator to “issue a reasoned written decision sufficient to explain 
the essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.”153 
But Verizon Wireless’s Customer Agreement does not require an 
arbitrator to issue a written decision and also limits the effect of an 
arbitration award: “An arbitration award and any judgment confirming it 
apply only to that specific case; it can’t be used in any other case except 
to enforce the award itself.”154 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently adopted a 
recommendation that arbitrators should issue reasoned opinions to 
accompany awards in all debt collection arbitrations.
155
 According to the 
FTC, the “opinions” should “state the law applied, explain the 
application of the law to the facts, and set forth a calculation of the 
amount awarded.”156 A separate question is what precedential effect 
these “opinions” should have on future cases. The FTC opined that 
“[b]ecause most of these opinions would involve relatively limited and 
case-specific factual disputes . . . [they] would not ordinarily be well-
suited for use as precedent in future proceedings.”157 That principle may 
not necessarily hold up for all debt collection proceedings and is 
certainly not applicable to all consumer arbitrations. 
                                                     
151. JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE CLAUSES 
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 3, Standard 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds-
2009.pdf. These standards became effective on July 15, 2009. Id. 
152. JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 22–23, R. 24(h) (2014), 
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_employment_ 
arbitration_rules-2014.pdf (requiring a “concise written statement of the reasons for the Award, 
stating the essential findings and conclusions on which the Award is based”). 
153. Netflix Terms of Use, supra note 96, § 15(e). 
154. Customer Agreement ¶ (7), VERIZON, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/support/ 
customer-agreement (last updated Aug. 18, 2015). 
155. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 64.  
156. Id. (footnote omitted). 
157. Id.  
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Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole would take the recommendation for a 
written decision one step further. She proposes that arbitration providers 
require arbitrators to “draft reasoned written opinions.”158 Professor 
Cole’s proposal would require the arbitrator to identify the issues in 
dispute, use the parties’ post-hearing briefs and hearing evidence to 
identify the parties’ contentions, state the decision, interpret the 
evidence, resolve questions of fact, apply principles of law and custom, 
and explain why he or she accepted or rejected the parties’ theories.159 In 
addition, the opinion must describe the award and its consequences for 
the disputants.
160
 Requiring some type of written decision by an 
arbitrator can reduce the concern about developing and preserving the 
rule of law, and serve as a guidepost for potential corporate error. But 
addressing this issue is complicated by the issue of confidentiality. 
E. The Confidentiality Problem 
Requiring a written decision does nothing to increase public 
awareness of the issue or deter conduct if the decision is confidential. 
The implementation of confidentiality provisions in consumer arbitration 
agreements perpetuates both the distrust of the system and an erosion of 
public cognizance to deter improper corporate behavior.
161
 Although 
arbitration is private, it is not automatically confidential unless the 
parties agree or the rules of the arbitral provider require 
confidentiality.
162
 But the concern that arbitral outcomes will remain 
secret is worrisome with respect to employment discrimination claims, 
consumer claims, and claims that affect public health and safety.
163
 
In early generation pre-dispute arbitration cases, the party opposing 
arbitration would frequently argue that a confidentiality clause rendered 
the agreement unenforceable.
164
 Many courts have held confidentiality 
clauses in consumer or employment arbitration agreements 
                                                     
158. Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Federalization of Consumer Arbitration: Possible Solutions, 2013 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 326–27 (2013). 
159. Id. at 304–05. 
160. Id.  
161. Amy J. Schmitz, Assuming Silence in Arbitration, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2011, at 16, 18 
(“Arbitrators’ bare awards fail to provide the parties with direction regarding future behavior. Lack 
of published opinions in arbitration also may allow for privatization of the law.”). 
162. Schmitz, supra note 142, at 1211.  
163. Schmitz, supra note 161, at 18.  
164. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 218 (2004) (“Many arbitration agreements provide that 
the arbitration proceedings and the award must be kept confidential.”). 
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unconscionable.
165
 But as if to reinforce the assumption that arbitration, 
by its nature, is confidential, the Court in Stolt-Neilson S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp.,
166
 cast confidentiality as a 
“presumption” that would be diluted by forced class arbitration.167 
Additionally, arbitrator ethical rules impose confidentiality duties on 
arbitrators.
168
 Yet in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 
the viability of the confidentiality agreement in the business-to-business 
arbitration agreement was a matter of some concern to the Court at oral 
argument and in the courts below.
169
 As the case bounced from Supreme 
Court to the Second Circuit over the course of nine years, American 
Express adopted the argument that costs of individual arbitration were 
not prohibitively high because the individual plaintiffs could share the 
costs of expert preparation.
170
 For example, individual plaintiffs could 
pool resources in selecting an expert, who would then develop a 
common expert report to address common issues. While the Second 
Circuit found this argument “intriguing,” the court held that it conflicted 
with the express language of the agreement prohibiting disclosure of 
                                                     
165. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a “secrecy provision” 
unconscionable, in part because “the unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent potential 
plaintiffs from obtaining the information needed to build a case of intentional misconduct or 
unlawful discrimination against [the defendant]”); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 153 Wash. 2d 
293, 315, 103 P.3d 753, 765 (2004) (holding confidentiality provision in employment contract 
unconscionable because “keeping past findings secret undermines an employee’s confidence in the 
fairness and honesty of the arbitration process and thus, potentially discourages that employee from 
pursuing a valid discrimination claim”); Randall, supra note 164, at 218 n.128 (collecting cases). 
166. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
167. Id. at 686 (reasoning that “[u]nder the Class Rules, the presumption of privacy and 
confidentiality that applies in many bilateral arbitrations shall not apply in class 
arbitrations, . . . thus potentially frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
168. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 
7, Canon VI(B) (2004) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL DISPUTES ETHICS], available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_003867 (“The arbitrator should 
keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision.”); cf. CONSUMER 
DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 147, at 3, Principle 12 (“Consistent with general expectations 
of privacy in arbitration hearings, the arbitrator should make reasonable efforts to maintain the 
privacy of the hearing to the extent permitted by applicable law.” (emphasis added)). Recognizing 
the “tension” between confidentiality and consumer need for data on arbitration and information on 
arbitrators, the reporter’s comments note that “[a]lthough confidentiality of hearings may be 
considered an advantage of arbitration, there is no absolute guarantee of confidentiality.” See id. at 
28 (providing reporter’s comments to Principle 12). 
169. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20–21, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. __, 
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133). 
170. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 318 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 
vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010), 
rev’d, Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316. 
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arbitration documents and filings to any other party.
171
 In the oral 
argument to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts posed the 
question as to whether a trade association or multiple claimants could 
collectively fund an expert report to be used by individual claimants.
172
 
American Express conceded that the confidentiality agreement would 
not prohibit such collective expert funding.
173
 
The extent of the “confidentiality problem” is not yet clear. The 
CFPB Arbitration Study found that most consumer financial product 
arbitration agreements it studied did not have confidentiality provisions, 
but checking-account arbitration agreements with confidentiality 
agreements still covered twenty-eight percent of the market.
174
 This may 
depict a move against confidentiality, at least in the consumer context. 
Some arbitration agreement drafters have already learned from the cases 
declaring the confidentiality clause in “underdog” cases to be 
unconscionable and have not required confidentiality in their consumer 
agreements.
175
 But as the language from Verizon Wireless’s arbitration 
agreement set forth above shows, corporate entities still desire to limit 
the precedential effect of arbitration on other cases. In order to dispel the 
opaqueness of arbitration, the minimal benefit gained through 
confidentiality is something that business disputants should forgo for 
entry to the alternative dispute arena. 
Most of the criticisms discussed above—bias, lack of judicial 
oversight, erosion of the rule of law, and confidentiality—stem, in part, 
from a concern that little is known about the process and outcome of 
underdog arbitration. Although the class waiver critique does not stem 
directly from lack of transparency, it is built on the theoretical idea that 
individual arbitration is unfair. But we lack empirical data that confirms 
or denies this theoretical concern. By passing legislation to increase 
transparency in underdog arbitration, Congress and state legislatures can 
                                                     
171. Id.  
172. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 169, at 20–21. 
173. Id. (“Our position is that multiple claimants in arbitration could share the costs of an expert 
for preparation of a report.”). But see Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (“The agreement also 
disallows any kind of joinder or consolidation of claims or parties. And more: Its confidentiality 
provision prevents Italian Colors from informally arranging with other merchants to produce a 
common expert report.”) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
174. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.8, at 52. 
175. See, e.g., Netflix Terms of Use, supra note 96, § 15(e); Wireless Customer Agreement, supra 
note 96, § 2.2(4). According to the CFPB’s Arbitration Study, most of the arbitration agreements in 
the scope of its study did not include nondisclosure or confidentiality agreements. CFPB 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.8, at 52–53. Analysis of the prevalence of confidentiality 
agreements in consumer and employment pre-dispute arbitration agreements is another area in 
which it would be useful to have more empirical evidence. 
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give the public, lawyers, academics, and government agencies the 
information needed to either dispel the myth of arbitration unfairness or 
confirm the necessity for increased regulation. 
III. A CALL TO CONGRESS: A LITTLE TRANSPARENCY FROM 
MY FRIENDS 
As set forth in the discussion above, many of the criticisms of 
underdog arbitration stem from the lack of transparency and oversight in 
the process. To date most critics have argued that arbitration should be 
off-limits for underdog claims through state unconscionability doctrines 
or the federal vindication-of-statutory-rights doctrine.
176
 But the 
Supreme Court has held that state courts may not treat arbitration clauses 
with hostility even for underdog claims and has effectively foreclosed 
the argument that the class waiver precludes vindication of statutory 
rights.
177
 Critics also argue that the FAA should be amended to preclude 
application to underdog claims. This has not been successful.
178
 This 
lack of success in excluding underdog claims is not surprising given 
various lobbying group efforts, the diversion of Congress’s attention 
elsewhere, and the lack of empirical evidence that arbitration is unfair or 
inaccessible to the average consumer. In response, many observers agree 
that the need for transparency is now at the forefront. How are we to 
achieve this transparency? What data set would be beneficial for 
prospective analysis? Building on the work of others in this area, I 
propose a neutral and workable paradigm for Congress and the states to 
implement with the goal of obtaining greater transparency and 
knowledge of this process to which many consumer and employee 
claims are being relegated. 
I propose that (1) Congress amend the FAA to require that arbitral 
providers report data on the arbitration proceedings for consumer, 
employment, and health-care claims (whether this is a claim regarding 
the quality of care or an insurance dispute), and states should enact an 
equivalent uniform reporting requirement; (2) the FAA and state 
arbitration laws should require that arbitrators “publish” online a short 
statement of the decision; and (3) the FAA and state counterparts should 
                                                     
176. See Gilles, supra note 30, at 399–404; Sternlight, supra note 15, at 686–87. Even if the 
vindication-of-statutory-rights defense had prevailed in Italian Colors, it would only provide a 
defense based on federal statutory rights, not state law claims.  
177. See supra Part I.  
178. But, as stated above, see supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text, next year the CFPB will 
propose a rule banning class-action waivers in consumer financial services pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements. 
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require data reporting by the business entities that require pre-dispute 
agreements from clients, customers, and employees. 
A. The Seemingly Obvious Solution: Mandated Data Reporting 
In light of the theoretically valid criticisms of arbitration explored 
above—arbitrator bias, lack of judicial oversight, and lack of publicity to 
the consumer or employee spheres—the solution is seemingly obvious. 
America needs to see the data. And the data needs to come from those 
with access to it, the arbitration service providers. While I would very 
much like to claim authorial pride in the novelty of this idea, it is not 
novel. Nor is it unduly burdensome. California, Maine, Maryland, and 
the District of Columbia have already enacted such data-reporting 
requirements.
179
 California’s law has been in effect since 2002. The 
Maine and Maryland statutes are of more recent vintage, 2012 and 2011 
respectively, no doubt reflecting the increasing public awareness of the 
lack of arbitral transparency.
180
 Additionally, the FTC recommended in 
its 2010 study of consumer debt collection practices, including 
arbitration, that Congress consider creating a nationwide system 
requiring arbitration forums to report and make public arbitration awards 
and decisions.
181
 
The state statutes, not surprisingly, have many commonalities. They 
all apply to consumer arbitrations, but also have provisions that purport 
to reach employment arbitrations. For example, Maine’s statute, the 
most recent, applies to “Providers of Consumer Arbitrations.”182 It goes 
on to require disclosure of the employee’s annual wage range “if the 
dispute involved employment” even though the statutory title and scope 
do not explicitly govern employment disputes.
183
 The state statutes 
generally require the providers to collect and publish in a publicly-
available “computer-searchable format”: (1) the name of the 
                                                     
179. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); D.C. CODE 
§ 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.). 
180. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903. 
181. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at v.  
182. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(1). 
183. Id. This imprecision in legislative drafting could lead to questionable applicability. Cf. CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (stating that it applies to “publication of consumer arbitration 
information” but also requiring data on employee claims in section 1281.96(a)(3)); D.C. CODE § 16-
4430 (requiring information from an arbitration organization on “each consumer arbitration it has 
administered or otherwise been involved in” but also indicating “employment” as a type of dispute 
(emphasis added)); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (applying only to consumer arbitration). 
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nonconsumer party and if the party is a business entity; (2) the type of 
dispute involved; (3) the wage range of the employee in an employment 
dispute; (4) whether the consumer prevailed; (5) the number a times a 
business disputant had previously appeared in a proceeding before the 
arbitral provider; (6) whether the consumer was represented by an 
attorney; (7) the dates the provider received the demand, appointed the 
arbitration, and the date of disposition; (8) the disposition (withdrawal, 
settlement, award with hearing, award without hearing, default, 
dismissal, etc.); (9) the amount of the claim; (10) the award or relief 
amount if any; (11) the name of the arbitrator; (12) the arbitrator’s fee; 
(13) the percentage of fee allocated to each party;
184
 and (14)  
[w]hether the provider has or within the preceding year had a 
financial interest in a party or the legal representation of a party 
in the arbitration or a party or legal representative of a party in 
the arbitration has or within the preceding year had a financial 
interest in the provider
185
  
(included, no doubt, to attempt to prevent another NAF debacle). 
California’s amended Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.96, effective 
this year, requires providers to disclose whether the arbitration was 
demanded pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause and more detailed 
information regarding the type of claim, award, and fee waivers.
186
 It 
also requires private arbitration companies to make the information 
available in a format that allows the public to search and sort the 
information, and to make the information directly accessible from a link 
on the company’s internet website.187 
But the state statutes are flawed. First, the FAA may preempt these 
state efforts regulating arbitration service providers.
188
 My proposal 
recommends that Congress, followed by state legislatures, adopt a 
uniform data-reporting requirement. Federal amendment of the FAA to 
require data reporting disposes of the ancillary preemption argument. 
But why require data reporting at the state level? Uniform state adoption 
                                                     
184. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96; D.C. CODE § 16-4430; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 1394; MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903. 
185. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394(1)(K). 
186. Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 93 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1281.96). 
187. Id. 
188. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (declaring arbitration agreement to be enforceable except upon general 
contract defenses). The general import of the FAA is that arbitration agreements cannot be treated 
with more hostility than regular contracts. But does that mean the State cannot regulate arbitration 
providers? That question is one worthy of an article in and of itself, although the FAA gives little 
guidance. 
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promotes uniform implementation among arbitral providers that may not 
(arguably) rise to the interstate commerce level.
189
 Uniformity among 
the legislative acts is essential, and compliance with the federal mandate 
should satisfy any corollary state reporting requirement. Many arbitral 
providers have national or multi-state practices. For data reporting to 
work in an effective way, the provider should report, but in a “one size 
satisfies all” fashion. 
One might ask why legislatively require data reporting at all? The 
AAA, which is one of the more widely used consumer arbitration 
providers,
190
 already provides data on arbitration disputes, as does 
JAMS.
191
 The AAA provides this information due to the California and 
Maryland arbitration reporting laws discussed above.
192
 But relying on 
this data alone, while informative, does not give legislators, academics, 
practitioners, or the general public information about the full picture of 
arbitration. Indeed, one could argue that because the AAA embraces 
consumer-friendly procedural mechanisms—such as fees capped at $200 
for the consumer
193
 and special rules governing consumer cases
194—that 
businesses seeking either to act unfairly toward consumers through 
arbitration or to have data publicly reported would avoid selecting the 
                                                     
189. See, e.g., Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd., 155 P.3d 16, 31 (Okla. 2006) (holding that a 
nursing home agreement does not fall within interstate commerce, thus the FAA did not preempt 
Oklahoma law precluding pre-dispute arbitration agreements for nursing home care); Bradley v. 
Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 318 (S.C. 2012) (residential real estate contract for sale of 
completed home did not involve interstate commerce, thus not subject to FAA). Bruner was likely 
wrongly decided, but the point remains that state courts continue to hold that certain state contracts 
are governed by state law and do not fall under the FAA because the economic activity does not rise 
to the level of interstate commerce. Would a representation agreement between a local lawyer and a 
client involve interstate commerce such that the FAA would control? In Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, 
& Williams, LLP v. Lopez, No. 13-1026, 2015 WL 3976101 (Tex. June 26, 2015), the Texas 
Supreme Court declined to impose a public policy requirement that attorneys explain arbitration 
agreements to prospective clients, despite a professional ethics opinion stating that such an 
explanation is required. Id. at *2. The court never discussed the FAA or preemption doctrine.  
190. Actual data confirming that the AAA is the “most” widely used arbitration service provider 
is hard to come by, perhaps proving the point. The CFPB Arbitration Study found that the AAA was 
the most commonly named administrator in the consumer financial products markets it studied, but 
in most product markets, it was designated as the “sole” arbitration administrator in less than fifty 
percent of the contracts studied. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.3, at 34–40. 
191. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/ 
aoe/gc/consumer (follow “Consumer Arbitration Statistics” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015); 
Consumer Case Information, JAMS, http://www.jamsadr.com/consumercases/ (last visited Oct. 21, 
2015). 
192. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 191. 
193. CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 145, at 33–36. The new rules were effective 
September 1, 2014. 
194. Id. 
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AAA. 
As an example of just how large this missing market share of 
unreported data might be, the CFPB found that a significant portion of 
arbitration agreements studied did not designate the AAA as the sole 
administrator. Only 18.3% of storefront payday-loan contracts, 16.7% of 
private student loan contracts, and 37.3% of prepaid cards studied 
designated the AAA as the sole administrator, although most of the 
contracts studied specified the AAA as either a sole administrator or 
potential administrator.
195
 But a significant market portion also identified 
JAMS as a potential arbitration administrator.
196
 And some specified no 
sole administrator. Some credit card agreements even identified the NAF 
as the sole administrator even though the NAF stopped administering 
consumer arbitration more than five years ago!
197
 By relying on only 
AAA (or JAMs) data, we obtain a limited piece—a piece potentially 
skewed by selection bias—of the consumer-arbitration picture.198 
Thus, the AAA data does not provide the public with a 
comprehensive view of consumer arbitration and its outcomes. But even 
the AAA data-collection mechanism has flaws that could be improved 
with this proposal. For example, the AAA disclaims any guarantee of 
accuracy or completeness of the data it provides.
199
 And the AAA data 
identifies a number of case dispositions as “administrative” or 
“withdrawn” without further explanation as to the case disposition.200 
Finally, other studies have found that the data entered in the AAA 
                                                     
195. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2.5.3, at 35–38. 
196. Id. (showing over fifty percent of the market share for credit cards, checking accounts, and 
payday loans had arbitration agreements that identified JAMS as an alternative).  
197. Id. at 35. 
198. The CFPB Arbitration Study and the Searle Institute Arbitration Study noted that relying 
solely on AAA data for arbitration “outcomes” analysis was a limitation for this very reason. CFPB 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.1, at 4; SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra 
note 10, at 2, 38 (recognizing that the results of any AAA study are not necessarily representative of 
all consumer arbitrations because other arbitration providers may attract different types of cases and 
different types of businesses). 
199. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 191 (“The AAA has not reviewed, investigated, 
or evaluated the accuracy or completeness of the arbitrator’s/arbitrators’ determination of the 
‘prevailing party’ and makes no representations regarding the accuracy or completeness of this 
information.”). 
200. Provider Organization Report, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/ 
aoe/gc/consumer (follow “Consumer Arbitration Statistics” hyperlink; then follow “Provider 
Organization Report” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) (noting an “administrative” disposition 
in 944 of 18,915 consumer arbitrations and “dismissed,” “impasse,” or “withdrawn” for significant 
portions of the data set); see also CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 5.2.2, at 11 (finding 
that in more than one third of disputes the AAA case records ends in a manner consistent with 
settlement, but we cannot know whether there was a settlement in any of those cases).  
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comprehensive consumer-arbitration statistics database have some 
inconsistencies in data points, such as amount claimed and amount 
awarded.
201
 In sum, relying on AAA data is useful to the extent it gives 
us a very informative view of the murky world of consumer arbitration, 
but it has significant limitations that could be improved on by this 
proposal. 
1. Data Reporting: The Necessity of a Penalty for Failure to Comply 
History tells us that even though law may require data reporting, that 
does not mean providers comply. Ten years after the enactment of 
California’s data reporting statute,202 a study commissioned by the 
California State Assembly Committee on the Judiciary found that “the 
great bulk if not all companies that appear to be doing mandatory 
consumer arbitrations in California are not complying with the law, and 
there are many shortcomings in the data.”203 As recognized by the 
California State Assembly study, a statutory requirement without civil 
penalty is hardly a requirement at all.
204
 According to the U.C. Hastings 
College of Law Public Law Research Institute study relied on in the 
Committee report, half of the private arbitration companies conducting 
business in California fail to post any of the information required by the 
statute, and of those that do attempt to disclose data, none fully 
complies.
205
 The failures in transparency are significant. For example, of 
the companies who do report, most fail to disclose the amount of the 
claim, a factor that is critical in evaluating award fairness.
206
 
Additionally, nearly half of the reporting companies do not consistently 
report the frequency with which the business party has previously used 
                                                     
201. See SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 40 (noting the levels of 
inconsistencies between the AAA data set and the case file sample reviewed for the project). 
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
203. KEVIN G. BAKER, ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMM., MANDATORY CONSUMER ARBITRATION: 
HAS COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA’S LANDMARK DATA TRANSPARENCY LAW BEEN SUFFICIENT 
TO ACCOMPLISH THE LEGISLATURE’S GOALS? 1 (2013), available at 
http://ajud.assembly.ca.gov/sites/ajud.assembly.ca.gov/files/reports/Arbitration%20Data%20Backgr
ound%20paper.pdf. 
204. Id. at 8 (noting that the significant omission of required data may continue to foster 
skepticism of mandatory consumer arbitration and could create a race to the bottom in which the 
most egregious violators of the data-reporting requirement have a competitive advantage).  
205. Id. at 7–8 (citing DAVID J. JUNG ET AL., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN 
CALIFORNIA 1, 5–7 (2013), available at http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/2014-
arbitration-update). 
206. Id. (citing JUNG ET AL., supra note 205, at 11–12). 
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the arbitration provider.
207
 Even though the California legislature 
amended the private arbitration disclosure requirement effective this 
year to require more specificity in categorical reporting and disclosure in 
a publicly useful format, it failed to enact a civil penalty for failure to 
comply.
208
 These failures invite the issue of transparency. If arbitration 
really is fair, why the failure to report?
209
 
Therefore, the FAA data-reporting requirement should include a civil 
penalty for failure to comply. For example, Maryland’s civil penalty 
statute provides that failure to comply with its data-reporting 
requirement “[m]ay be considered as a factor in determining whether a 
consumer arbitration agreement is unconscionable or otherwise 
unenforceable under law.”210 And, the statute provides for a private right 
of action such that “[a] consumer or the Attorney General may seek an 
injunction to prohibit an arbitration organization that has engaged in or 
is engaging in a violation of § 14-3903 of this subtitle from continuing 
or engaging in the violation.”211 Even so, a private right of enforcement 
or the fact that underreporting can be considered as a factor in an 
unconscionability action are hardly penalties that would give a lucrative 
but potentially biased arbitral provider pause. The data-reporting 
requirement I propose should attach a significant penalty: If the 
arbitration service provider is substantially non-compliant with the 
requirement, the consumer can enjoin enforcement of the provisions 
selecting that particular service provider and may, in the consumer’s 
discretion, choose another arbitral service provider. While this potential 
remedy does affect the business disputant, who may have little control 
                                                     
207. Id. (citing JUNG ET AL., supra note 205, at 14–16). 
208. Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 93 (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 1281.96). The most the amendment accomplished was the inclusion of a statement that “[i]t is the 
intent of the Legislature that private arbitration companies comply with all legal obligations of this 
section.” 
209. The response from arbitration administrators would likely be that reporting is costly, 
problems are raised by the confidentiality provisions in some agreements and by arbitrator ethical 
rules, see AAA COMMERCIAL DISPUTES ETHICS, supra note 168, and there is no uniform reporting 
module. This proposal would alleviate some of those concerns by removing confidentiality from 
consumer arbitration and enhancing uniformity in reporting. But if consumers are obtaining fair 
results in arbitration, or a high settlement ratio, or even one hundred percent business-funded 
dispute resolution, one would expect businesses to actively market this consumer-friendly module in 
favor of arbitration.   
210. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3905(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). But 
it may not be the sole reason to refuse to enforce a consumer arbitration award. 
211. Section 14-3905(c)(2) provides that “[t]he arbitration organization is liable to the person 
bringing the action for an injunction for the person’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs if: (i) [t]he 
court issues the injunction; or (ii) [t]he arbitration organization voluntarily complies with § 14-3903 
of this subtitle after the action is filed.” Id. § 14-3905(c)(2). 
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over the arbitration service provider’s compliance, that is an efficient 
allocation of market resources.
212
 The business client of arbitration 
providers will necessarily select providers who are compliant so as to 
avoid enforcement of the penalty. And in response to demand, arbitral 
service providers will comply with reporting requirements. 
2. Data Reporting: The Necessity of Useful Data Fields 
Another lesson learned from California Civil Procedure Code section 
1281.96 is that for data reporting to be useful, certain fields are 
important. The state statutes provide a starting point. The table below 
reflects common state statutory requirements that should be retained on 
the left, and fields that are necessary for further data evaluation on the 
right.
213
 
 
Statutory Fields that Should Be 
Retained 
Additional Fields that Should Be 
Required 
Case type (goods, credit, banking, 
health-care, insurance, 
construction, real estate, 
telecommunications, personal 
injury, debt collection, 
employment, etc.)
214
 
Nature of the complaint (breach of 
warranty, breach of contract, 
breach of statutory law, fraud, 
personal injury, products liability, 
racial or gender discrimination, 
unconscionability, etc.) 
If employment, employee wage 
range 
The product or service involved 
Whether the consumer was the 
prevailing party 
Was the consumer the plaintiff? 
Name of the business entity 
involved 
Was the business entity 
represented by an attorney? 
 
                                                     
212. There is the possibility that an arbitration service provider could conduct so few consumer or 
employee arbitrations that application of a civil penalty to it would be onerous. Thus, the data-
reporting requirement could be limited to those providers that conduct fifty or more consumer or 
employee disputes per year. Cf. D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015) (limiting 
applicability to arbitration organizations “involved in 50 or more consumer arbitrations a year”). 
“Consumer” should be broadly construed to include, for example, services arising out of health-care 
from medical providers or consumer/employee contracts with health-insurance providers.  
213. To reduce the burden on arbitration administrators and enhance uniformity in reporting, I 
propose that the legislation adopting this approach specify a detailed coding grid that should be used 
for reporting purposes.  
214. As noted above, California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.96 was recently amended to 
require more detail in the nature of the dispute. Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 
93.  
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Statutory Fields that Should Be 
Retained (continued) 
Additional Fields that Should Be 
Required (continued) 
Number of times the business has 
been a party to arbitration in which 
the provider was involved 
Name and address of the business 
entity’s attorney representative, if 
any 
Whether the consumer was 
represented by an attorney 
The name and address of the 
consumer’s attorney 
representative
215
 
Date the service provider received 
the demand, date arbitrator was 
appointed, and date of disposition 
rendered 
Was a hearing held? Was it 
telephonic? In-person? 
Type of disposition (withdrawal, 
abandonment, settlement, award 
post hearing, award without 
hearing, default or dismissal) 
Address at which any hearing was 
conducted
216
 
Amount of the claim Were any counter-claims raised? 
What was the nature of such 
claims and amount? 
Amount of the award Was the claim determined to be 
frivolous? 
Arbitrator’s name Number of times the arbitrator has 
handled a case involving the 
business entity involved in this 
dispute 
Amount of arbitrator’s fee Amount of administrative fees 
Percentage of fee paid by each 
party 
Percentage of administrative fees 
paid by each party 
Whether the provider currently has, 
or had within the preceding year, a 
financial interest in a party or legal 
representative of a party, or 
whether a party or legal 
representative of a party had a 
financial interest in the provider. 
Components of the award (Any 
premium awarded? Attorney’s 
fees?
217
 Punitive damages or civil 
penalties?) 
                                                     
215. Maryland Commercial Law section 14-3903 requires the name of the consumer attorney, as 
does the amended California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.96. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW 
§ 14-3903; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.), 
amended by Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. Stat. 93. 
216. To determine proximity to the plaintiff-disputant. 
217. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96, amended by Act effective Jan. 1, 2015, ch. 870, 2014 Cal. 
Stat. 93 (requiring disclosure of awarded attorney’s fees). 
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Statutory Fields that Should Be 
Retained (continued) 
Additional Fields that Should Be 
Required (continued) 
Fee waiver requested? 
Approved?
218
 
Total time to claim resolution 
 If withdrawn, basis for withdrawal 
(e.g., nonpayment of fees? 
Disqualification of a party?) 
Was discovery permitted? 
Was the arbitration asserted as a 
class? 
Did the arbitration proceed as a 
class? 
 
Reporting this additional information serves a number of purposes. 
First, more detailed information about the nature of the claim and the 
product or service involved provides important messaging to consumers, 
federal regulatory agencies, and state attorneys general that something 
may be amiss when similar claims increase in filing. This transparency 
helps diminish the loss of publicity of public court proceedings 
discussed in Part II.D, supra. Additionally, providing the name of the 
consumer attorney could be a helpful resource to consumers seeking 
arbitration assistance for a similar claim. Requiring information about 
whether the business is represented by counsel and the name of such 
counsel will provide another layer of inquiry into the potential problem 
of repeat-player bias. Information about counterclaims and their basis is 
essential to understanding any arbitral award. Further, to understand 
whether arbitral awards are fair, and whether consumer-incentive 
premiums offer anything but an illusory promise, we need to know the 
specific components of the award. Similarly, if the arbitrator determined 
that a claim is frivolous, this may mean a consumer pays a higher 
portion of fees. This information would be very important in evaluating 
the fairness of “consumer-friendly” arbitration provisions. Finally, 
information about whether the demand was lodged or proceeded as a 
class will provide helpful information in elucidating what occurs in class 
arbitration as opposed to individual arbitration. 
One thing should be clear when analyzing the data-reporting 
requirements. To comply, the arbitration cannot be confidential.
219
 The 
                                                     
218. These requirements were added by 2014 amendment to section 1281.96 of the California 
Civil Procedure Code. Id. 
219. See Melworm, supra note 124, at 470 (“The best way to address issues of arbitrator bias, 
therefore, is to ensure that from the onset, arbitrators are required to openly and broadly disclose 
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waiver of confidentiality is an inherent feature of required data reporting 
and one that should be adopted without question in underdog arbitration. 
For business-to-business arbitration, one can easily see the efficacy of 
confidentiality. It secures the confidentiality of trade secrets, business 
agreements, profits, and settlements. But for business-to-consumer or 
business-to-employee disputes, the benefits of confidentiality fade. A 
business may claim that confidentiality prevents more consumers from 
knowing about a meritorious claim and thus reduces filing of claims. But 
permitting businesses to hide wrongful practices in the shadow of 
arbitration has never been the purpose of a theoretically fair alternative 
dispute resolution forum. Indeed, if, as arbitration proponents such as 
myself contend, arbitration is fair then its players should be willing 
participants in disclosing this data to the public. As a price to arbitration 
entry, it would be an implicit waiver of the ability to require 
confidentiality of the required data fields. 
3. Making the Data Useful: The Necessity of a Uniform Consumer-
Friendly Reporting Mechanism 
Most of the state statutes requiring data reporting specify that 
information be available to the public in a “computer-searchable” 
database.
220
 But as we know from the California experience, this phrase 
has been interpreted to mean a simple text file (with the exception of the 
AAA, which does provide useful data in a searchable format),
221
 which 
has been unhelpful for research purposes and is not useful to a 
consumer.
222
 The California Judiciary Committee recommended that a 
“fundamental improvement” to section 1281.96 is to require a 
spreadsheet format for the reporting mechanism.
223
 California did make 
some progress by amending its statutory disclosure requirement this past 
year to require disclosure in a “single cumulative report”224 “in a format 
that allows the public to search and sort the information using readily 
                                                     
prior relationships and dealings that may overlap or intertwine with the pending arbitration.”).  
220. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96; D.C. CODE § 16-4430 (LEXIS through Sept. 16, 2015); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Maryland’s statute 
does not specify the form of the data, but does require that it be available to the public. MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903. 
221. The AAA provides consumer arbitration statistics in spreadsheet format in its Provider 
Organization Report. See Provider Organization Report, supra note 200.  
222. BAKER, supra note 203, at 10. 
223. Id. 
224. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a). 
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available software.”225 
My proposal would go one step further. I recommend that Congress 
adopt a spreadsheet format with the data fields implemented as columns. 
Each arbitration provider should be required to use the approved 
electronic form and publish it on the provider website, thereby achieving 
uniformity and accessibility among providers and among the states in a 
format that is user-friendly for researchers, academics, lawyers, state 
attorneys general, consumers, and employees. 
B. The FAA Should Require Arbitrators in Consumer and Employee 
Disputes to Issue a Statement of Decision 
The second part of my proposal to increase transparency in “underdog 
arbitration” is to amend the FAA and adopt uniform state requirements 
that each arbitrator of a consumer or employment claim issue a 
statement of decision. As noted above, the lack of a record from the 
arbitrator presents some troubling concerns. It inhibits the rule of law by 
privatizing these decisions.
226
 It means that different arbitrators may 
reach conflicting decisions on the same issue without ever being aware 
of a similarly situated decision-maker’s result. It removes an important 
messaging mechanism served by our open courts to businesses and the 
public about potentially wrongful business practices or products. And it 
means that a reviewing court (to the extent there is judicial review) may 
have no basis for evaluating the arbitrator’s understanding of the law or 
rationale in reaching a decision. 
Recognizing these concerns of unbridled adjudicatory power, a 
number of commentators have advocated for the requirement of a 
written decision when arbitrators decide employee or consumer cases. 
After its 2010 study of consumer debt collection practices, the FTC 
concluded that “arbitrators should issue reasoned opinions to accompany 
awards in all debt collection arbitration proceedings.”227 Not 
surprisingly, the FTC found that the benefit of such opinions is that it 
would help the parties understand the rationale for the amounts the 
arbitrators awarded, would assist with judicial review of such decisions, 
and would help inform public assessment of private debt collection 
arbitration proceedings.
228
 
Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole takes a similar position. Professor Cole 
                                                     
225. Id. § 1281.96(b). 
226. See supra Part II.C.  
227. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 64. 
228. Id.  
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proposes that private arbitrator providers require arbitrators to “draft 
reasoned written opinions.”229 Professor Cole’s proposal would require 
the arbitrator to identify the issues in dispute, use the parties’ post-
hearing briefs and hearing evidence to identify the parties’ contentions, 
state the decision, interpret the evidence, resolve questions of fact, apply 
principles of law and custom, and explain why he or she accepted or 
rejected the parties’ theories.230 Finally, the opinion must describe the 
award and its consequences for the disputants.
231
 
There is an added benefit to requiring a statement of decision from the 
arbitrator in addition to the important message it sends to the public. As 
any judge, law clerk, professor, or indeed law student knows, there is an 
educational function to the writing process. By putting the law and the 
application of the facts to the page, one comes to understand it in a way 
one had not previously comprehended, and the requirement of the 
writing process may indeed lead a person to a result different from what 
one originally thought. Nonetheless, the danger in requiring an online 
publishable statement of decision from an arbitrator is that it will 
increase the cost and complexity of arbitral decisions. Thus, while I 
agree with Professor Cole’s proposal in spirit—that there should be 
some written decision reflecting the arbitrator’s decision in a consumer 
or employee arbitration case—I propose a more simplified approach. 
My proposal specifically rejects the necessity of a legal opinion that 
would explain in detail the resolution of all fact issues and the rationale 
for accepting or rejecting the various theories. Instead, my statement of 
decision would require two components: (1) a statement of the 
applicable law and (2) application of the facts (as the arbitrator 
determined them to be credible) to that law.
232
 Requiring this statement 
of decision would allow the public to know if arbitrators are engaging in 
manifest disregard of the law and inherently would put pressure on 
arbitrators to resist this temptation. Additionally, while requiring a 
decision statement would admittedly increase the burden on arbitrators, 
that burden is not significant. First, confidence in arbitration is based, in 
                                                     
229. Cole, supra note 158, at 327. 
230. Id. at 304–05; see also, e.g., Burch, supra note 122, at 81–82 (advocating for reasoned 
opinions in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration and claiming that “the benefits of reasoned opinions 
outweigh their costs and would improve the procedural fairness of mandatory arbitration for the 
parties subjected to it”). 
231. See Cole, supra note 158, at 305.  
232. Cf. FTC CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION REPORT, supra note 21, at 64 (requiring the 
proposed opinion to “state the law applied, explain the application of the law to the facts, and set 
forth a calculation of the amount awarded, including breaking the amount into principal, interest, 
and fees”). 
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part, on the belief that an industry expert selected as an arbitrator will 
have more experience and ease in resolving a dispute, thereby increasing 
the efficiency of the dispute resolution process. Such decisions should be 
no great effort for industry legal experts who are knowledgeable in the 
law. Second, the effort perceived is no more than we expect of even 
first-year law students on exams—to identify the issue based on the facts 
presented by the parties, state the law, and apply it.
233
 Again, acceptance 
of some increased complexity to ensure a transparent process is 
appropriate when balanced with the risks a complete lack of decision 
provides. Indeed, as exemplified by the Netflix agreement cited above, 
some industry providers are already moving to the contractual 
requirement of a statement of decision.
234
 
C. The FAA Should Require Business Entities That Require Binding 
Pre-Dispute Arbitration for Consumers or Employees to Annually 
Report Data on the Extent and Nature of Such Arbitrations 
The third and final piece of my proposal to lend transparency to 
arbitration for “underdog” disputes is to require a dual prong of data 
reporting. The first prong recommends imposing data reporting on the 
arbitral service provider. This prong requires data reporting by those 
entities that would enter this alternative dispute arena. Congress should 
amend the FAA to require business entities that require binding pre-
dispute arbitration for consumers or employees to annually report and 
make publically available data regarding arbitration claims and their 
outcomes. Initially, data for consumer claims should be reported to the 
FTC, the entity charged with “protect[ing] consumers by stopping 
unfair, deceptive or fraudulent practices in the marketplace.”235 Data for 
employment arbitration should be provided to the Department of Labor, 
the federal department charged with “foster[ing], promot[ing] and 
develop[ing] the welfare of the wage earners, job seekers, and retirees of 
the United States.”236 But the real value in the data-reporting 
requirement is that the data must be publicly available. Thus, the data 
would be available and useful to other federal agencies, such as the 
                                                     
233. The caveat is that a failure to apply the correct law for an arbitrator may mean a loss of 
business as opposed to a below-curve grade on the exam.  
234. Netflix Terms of Use, supra note 96, § 15. 
235. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2015). 
236. Our Mission, U.S. DEPARTMENT LAB., http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdol/mission.htm (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2015).  
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CFPB and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It 
would also be available for state attorneys general to research potential 
patterns of deceptive trade practices that might otherwise go unnoticed 
through the veil of arbitration. Finally, the data would be available to 
consumer and consumer reporting agencies such as Consumer Reports. 
This information would be helpful in determining whether, for example, 
to seek employment with a particular employer or whether to buy a 
particular product. A consumer might be dissuaded from purchasing a 
product, for example, if the consumer sees that hundreds of arbitration 
claims have been filed regarding a particular product model, regardless 
of the outcome of those arbitrations. The very presence of numerous 
claims suggests that something is amiss that may not justify the cost or 
cost-savings. No doubt publications whose very mission is to provide 
consumers information about product utility would find this information 
important in assessing value. 
One question might be, why require data reporting from both the 
arbitration service provider and the business/disputant?
237
 Requiring 
businesses to report data to the public would necessitate business self-
analysis. Once a company must make information about claims public, 
consumer marketing is more likely to assess the information. Then, for 
example, if it becomes clear that the company is receiving the benefit of 
repeat-player bias, this becomes a marketing problem both for the 
company and for pre-dispute mandatory arbitration.
238
 Similarly, once a 
company is aware that it must make the number of claims and the result 
public, it will necessarily become concerned with correcting perceived 
discrimination or deceptive trade practices based on the data to avoid 
investigation by state attorneys general or the EEOC and to avoid public 
boycott. Additionally, reporting at the business level provides an easy-
access point for consumers interested in claims data based on product or 
manufacturer type. The recent CFPB Arbitration Study tells us that most 
consumers do not know if they can sue their credit card provider in 
court.
239
 It would be expecting much more of a consumer to know he or 
                                                     
237. Thank you to Professor Christopher Drahozal for raising this question, among others, in 
response to a draft of this Article.  
238. As an example of the power of the marketplace, consider the story of General Mills, which 
adopted a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement for its products this summer. After 
significant negative market reaction (which may have been based on some misperceptions of 
arbitration discussed in this Article), General Mills recanted the terms. See Kirstie Foster, We’ve 
Listened – and We’re Changing Our Legal Terms Back, TASTE GEN. MILLS (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/weve-listened-and-were-changing-our-legal-terms-back-
to-what-they-were/. 
239. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 3.4.3, at 18–19, 19 tbl.1. Overall, fifty-two 
 
10 - Lampley.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:08 PM 
2015] TRANSPARENT “UNDERDOG” ARBITRATION 1777 
 
she could search a uniform database to extrapolate claims information in 
arbitration regarding a particular product or manufacturer.
240
 Providing 
this information on a company website would be more likely to reach the 
target audience, the consumer. 
So what form should the data-reporting requirement take? As with 
data reporting at the arbitral service level, some uniformity is necessary. 
The data reported should be in a uniform form or spreadsheet, much like 
an SEC filing. And what data should be required? This proposal seeks 
the basic information a researcher and/or prospective stakeholder would 
want. The business entity should report: 
1. The number of arbitration claims filed in which it was a 
defendant; 
2. Whether it was an employment or consumer claim; 
3. The product or service that was the basis of claim; 
4. The defect or practice complained of; 
5. The arbitrator used (service and provider); 
6. The outcome (win, loss, settle, default, or withdrawal); 
7. Damages awarded; and 
8. Fees and costs awarded. 
The major criticism to data reporting at the business-player level is 
that it will increase the complexity of arbitration, which by its nature is 
attractive due to its low-cost and efficiency. But there are many reports 
that business entities already must file: corporate registrations, annual 
business designations, and SEC reports are just a few examples. For 
example, to participate in the market as a publicly-held company, the 
business entity is required to comply with multiple SEC reporting 
requirements. By analogy, this amendment to the FAA to require 
relatively simplistic data reporting could be seen as the cost of entry to 
alternative dispute resolution when the consumer/employee has no 
bargaining power. In other words, to play the game, you have to pay the 
cost of entry, which is data reporting designed to provide information to 
the public. Additionally, as noted above, to the extent underdog 
arbitration is a fair alternative venue to the courts, the business entities 
                                                     
percent of consumers did not know if he or she had the right to sue in court. Id. at 18. Of those who 
believed they could sue in court and were actually subject to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, 
eighty percent were wrong, even adjusting for small-claims court carve-outs. Id. at 20–21. 
240. Although consumers may care little about dispute resolution procedures at the time of 
product acquisition (which may be due to a variety of factors including lack of knowledge about 
arbitration or lack of choice), consumers would likely care a great deal about product performance. 
If a consumer could find data on product claims, this could serve as a useful signpost for product 
performance. 
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preferring this resolution model should be more than willing to deliver 
the data illustrating it. 
D. Increased Transparency: A Step in the Right Direction, but Not a 
Panacea 
The goal advanced by the proposal set forth above is to increase 
transparency and tools for assessment in an area in which little is still 
known about consumer, and to a lesser degree, employment arbitration. 
Even still, there are some inherent limitations in the proposal for data 
collection and decisional reporting. First, a significant limitation is that 
even with enhanced uniformity in reporting, problems will still likely 
persist with interpretation in coding. For example, an analysis of the 
amount claimed in arbitration is an important variable. The Searle Civil 
Justice Institute Report on Consumer Arbitration conducted a study of 
301 AAA consumer arbitrations. But the study found that “determining 
the amount claimed turns out to be more difficult than sometimes 
assumed.”241 This is because claimants often combine different damage 
elements, compensatory damages, interest, attorneys’ fees, or punitive 
damages, into a single claim amount.
242
 Additionally, some claimants 
specify the claim amount not as a single number, but a range.
243
 Still 
further, the Searle Civil Justice Institute Report found several 
inconsistencies between the AAA reporting of award claim and amount 
and its own findings due to the compounding of compensatory damages 
with other damage categories.
244
 
A more theoretical infirmity in the above proposal concerns the use of 
such data. As evidenced by the debate between Public Citizen and 
others, simply assessing a consumer “win-rate” in arbitration, or 
percentage of recovery versus amount claimed, cannot demonstrate 
whether arbitration is inherently “fair,” although it is useful information 
in capturing the big picture.
245
 One method of assessing arbitration 
would be to compare arbitration results with litigation results, but many 
                                                     
241. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 47. 
242. Id.  
243. Id.  
244. Id. at 40. 
245. See id. at 9. Compare PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD 
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
ArbitrationTrap.pdf, with Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer 
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1051, 1056 (2009) (pointing out that 
emphasis on “wins” vs. “losses” in consumer-collection arbitration misses the point that a reduction 
in a claim asserted by a business against the consumer could be perceived as a win). 
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factors make this comparison difficult.
246
 The cases assessed must be 
similar, and one should take into account that arbitration fees may be 
lower (or nonexistent), encouraging more filings that are less likely to 
succeed. Additionally, dispositive motions are used with greater 
frequency in litigation.
247
 And it would be almost impossible to gauge 
the loss or benefit to consumers from waiving the class device and 
having the ability to proceed individually to arbitration, particularly 
when the arbitration is funded by the business. Even though it is unlikely 
that a precise “apples to apples” comparison could be achieved, the 
information gleaned from the reporting called for in this proposal would 
help policy-makers understand the events occurring in consumer 
arbitration and would encourage ethical practices from business and 
arbitration service providers simply due to heightened transparency. 
While it may be almost impossible to determine whether a consumer 
would have recovered more in court individually, or more abstractly, as 
a member of a class, we can obtain sufficient information to determine if 
we, as a society, should continue to condone arbitration of consumer and 
employee claims. 
Finally, a related concern not addressed by this proposal, but certainly 
worthy of additional exploration, is the lack of available information 
about the prevalence of arbitration agreements in consumer or 
employment contexts and the use of certain features. Some studies 
providing this information have come to fruition, such as the CFPB 
Arbitration Study, which provides an empirical analysis of the 
prevalence of arbitration agreements in six consumer financial product 
markets.
248
 A pervasive problem is in obtaining a complete data set 
representative of the market.
249
 One idea for further development is 
                                                     
246. SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 9–10; Eisenberg & Hill, supra 
note 10, at 45 (noting the differences between arbitration and court-resolved disputes lead to 
differences in case characteristics and settlement rates).  
247.  SEARLE INSTITUTE ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 10, at 9–10.  
248. CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 1, § 2; see also PUBLIC CITIZEN, FORCED 
ARBITRATION UNFAIR AND EVERYWHERE (2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
UnfairAndEverywhere.pdf; Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 55, 62 (2004) (examining prevalence and features of arbitration agreements in the consumer 
context); Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, 882–83; Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 16 
(analyzing a full set of 293 consumer credit card agreements submitted to the Federal Reserve 
pursuant to The Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility, and Disclosure Act (Credit CARD Act) 
of 2009) (collecting studies); Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data 
in Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 145 (2010) (describing difficulty in 
obtaining actual card agreements for use in empirical analysis). 
249. See Schmitz, supra note 248, at 145 (describing difficulty in obtaining credit card 
agreements for empirical analyses). 
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whether corporate entities availing themselves of the private dispute 
forum should be required to provide their arbitration agreements to a 
central reporting agency, such as the FTC. For example, the Credit Card 
Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009
250
 requires 
creditors to provide electronic credit card agreements to the CFPB that it 
publishes on its website.
251
 The AAA also requires that businesses which 
use its service register their consumer arbitration clause with its 
“Consumer Clause Registry,” which allows online access to the 
arbitration clause.
252
 Additionally, the AAA reviews the consumer 
arbitration clause to determine if it “substantially and materially” 
complies with the AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocol.253 These 
consumer agreement databases provide important sources of material for 
future empirical work, but are still limited in subject matter. Thus, the 
idea of a central repository for consumer and employee arbitration 
agreements is a consideration worth further development. 
CONCLUSION 
The trajectory of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to 
consumer and employee pre-dispute arbitration tells us that, for now, 
arbitration is a viable alternative forum to the courts. More and more 
important consumer and employment claims will be relegated to a 
dispute resolution process that at the moment is highly opaque. The 
Court’s approval of arbitration as an alternative forum is based on the 
theoretical perception that arbitration is a fair forum for resolving 
consumer and employee disputes, even if those claims involve low-value 
damages and even if there was little or no bargaining power in agreeing 
to the arbitration clause. But as discussed above, there is little reliable 
evidence available to suggest that this theoretical perception of the 
fairness of arbitration is correct. And as far as theory goes, the 
theoretical criticisms of binding pre-dispute arbitration for employee and 
consumer claims have merit. The problems discussed above include the 
presence of bias, due in part to the repeat-player effect; the lack of 
judicial oversight; the removal of publicity from the proceedings, 
including the inhibition of development of the rule of law; and an overall 
                                                     
250. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 
123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., and 32 U.S.C.). 
251. 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2012); see also Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 1, at 7 (using card 
agreements provided under the Credit CARD Act of 2009 as a data set).  
252. Consumer Clause Registry, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/ 
aoe/gc/consumer (follow “Consumer Clause Registry” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2015). 
253.  Id.  
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public distrust. All of these criticisms stem from a lack of transparency 
in the process. Thus, achieving greater transparency will either fortify 
public confidence in the process or provide the public with empirical 
evidence needed to call its appropriateness into question. Either way, 
increased transparency serves the greater public good by providing 
concrete information about the resolution process to which so many 
underdog claims are being shuffled. 
But how to achieve this transparency? I propose a tri-part solution 
calling for Congress to amend the FAA and the states to follow through 
uniform arbitration laws requiring: (1) Data reporting of arbitration 
statistics in consumer and employee claims by the arbitration service 
provider; (2) A written statement of decision by the arbitrator stating the 
applicable law and applying the facts to that law; and (3) Data reporting 
by the businesses seeking to impose mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
on their consumers or employees. By requiring data reporting and 
decision statements in “underdog” arbitration, Congress has an 
opportunity to strike a middle chord in this debate that is becoming 
increasingly political. And arbitration participants, such as businesses 
wishing to avoid expensive discovery costs and class proceedings in 
court, have an opportunity to put the proverbial proof in the pudding. If 
arbitration is fair for consumers, if arbitration can work as it should, then 
show us the numbers. 
 
